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2
Abstract
As software evolves, becoming a more integral part of complex systems, modern society be-
comes more reliant on the proper functioning of such systems. However, the field of software
quality assurance lacks detailed empirical studies from which best practices can be deter-
mined. The fundamental factors that contribute to software quality are faults, failures and
fixes, and although some studies have considered specific aspects of each, comprehensive
studies have been quite rare. Thus, the fact that we establish the cause-effect relationship
between the fault(s) that caused individual failures, as well as the link to the fixes made to
prevent the failures from (re)occurring appears to be a unique characteristic of our work. In
particular, we analyze fault types, verification activities, severity levels, investigation effort,
artifacts fixed, components fixed, and the effort required to implement fixes for a large in-
dustrial case study. The analysis includes descriptive statistics, statistical inference through
formal hypothesis testing, and data mining. Some of the most interesting empirical results
include (1) Contrary to popular belief, later life-cycle faults dominate as causes of failures.
Furthermore, over 50% of high priority failures (e.g., post-release failures and safety-critical
failures) were caused by coding faults. (2) 15% of failures led to fixes spread across multi-
ple components and the spread was largely affected by the software architecture. (3) The
amount of effort spent fixing faults associated with each failure was not uniformly distributed
across failures; fixes with a greater spread across components and artifacts, required more
effort. Overall, the work indicates that fault prevention and elimination efforts focused on
later life cycle faults is essential as coding faults were the dominating cause of safety-critical
failures and post-release failures. Further, statistical correlation and/or traditional data
mining techniques show potential for assessment and prediction of the locations of fixes and
the associated effort. By providing quantitative results and including statistical hypothesis
testing, which is not yet a standard practice in software engineering, our work enriches the
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From the convenience of finding the local coffee shop to necessity of supporting human life
people rely on software daily. The consequences of software that fails to perform as expected
vary across instances ranging from a slight inconvenience to the user to loss of human life.
As software continues to evolve, becoming a more integral part of complex systems, the
likelihood that it can contribute to catastrophic accidents increases. Thus, ensuring the
proper functioning of software is of greater concern than ever before.
Quality assurance refers to a planned and systematic pattern of all actions necessary
to provide adequate confidence that an item or product conforms to established technical
requirements. It includes set of activities designed to evaluate the process by which products
are developed or manufactured [39]. Many organization have a separate department devoted
solely to quality assurance, but with respect to software, quality assurance is an emerging
field and thus it lacks empirical studies from which best practices can be determined.
The fundamental factors contributing to software quality are faults and failures. Based
on the fact that various definitions exists, which have been used inconsistently in the past
we begin by providing definitions, which were adapted from [39].
• A fault is an accidental condition or event, which if encountered, may cause the system
or system component to fail to perform as required. Faults are the results of an incorrect
step, process, or data definition in a computer program that can be introduced at any
phase of the software life cycle.
• A failure is the inability of a system or component to perform its required functions
within specified performance requirements.
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Failures are caused by faults. However, not every fault will lead to a failure since the
conditions under which a fault would result in a failure may never be met. In fact, the
relationship between faults and failure is very complex and mainly unexplored. Our previous
work [29], [30] which investigated the adequacy, accuracy, scalability, and uncertainty of
architecture-based software reliability models using two large scale open source case studies,
found that certain assumptions pertaining to the relationship between faults and failures
(e.g., the assumption that each failure can be traced to a single component) do not appear
to hold true and some heuristics used in related work (e.g., associating an individual failure
with one unique fault) could not be justified. In fact, we found evidence that a single failure
may be caused by multiple concurrent faults spread across components and a single fault
may cause different failures depending on circumstances. Thus, to avoid making assumptions
or using heuristics we define an additional term, fix.
• A fix refers collectively to all changes made to correct the fault(s) that caused an
individual failure. Thus, a fix encompasses all faults associated with a single failure.
With respect to these definitions there are a few points to be noted. First, faults can
be tied to any software artifact (e.g., requirements, design, source code, etc). Second, we
consider both observed and potential failures, that is, failures that occurred during operation
as well as failures that were prevented from happening by detecting and fixing faults during
development and testing. Lastly, in a few cases, the changes made to implement a fix may be
implementing a work-around that prevents a failure from reoccurring, rather than actually
addressing the root cause fault(s) of the failure (i.e., less than 2%). Throughout this work we
use the term failure to refer to both potential and observed failures, and use the terms fixes
and changes interchangeably since we only consider changes made to fix faults and/or prevent
failures from (re)occurring (i.e., we do not consider changes made for planned updates or
requested enhancements).
Of course, as eluded to earlier not all failures are equal. Clearly, failures that can cause
a loss of human life or a loss of mission critical functionality are of greater concern than, for
example, failures that result in somewhat degraded system performance or a simple incon-
venience. Additionally, operational failures are also of great concern as they can be more
costly to fix, may lead to critical consequences (e.g., loss of mission) and/or can have a signif-
icant impact on an organization’s reputation. Even when some failures do not significantly
Margaret L. Hamill Chapter 1. Introduction 3
impact the system operation or contribute the critical consequences, if similar failures occur
frequently, they too may need to be prevented.
The idea of implementing well planned quality assurance practices is just now becoming
standard practice. It is well known that failures can be prevented by either avoiding the
insertion of faults or by detecting and correcting faults during development and testing.
However, the best practices and effort required for doing so can differ from system to system
and throughout the development life-cycle. For example, as software matures, software
reliability growth usually occurs and thus fault and failure characteristics change. Although,
fault and failure analysis has shown to be quite beneficial in the past (e.g., an estimated seven
million dollars in rework was saved by implementing guidelines and checklists developed
based on a empirical study of software faults in [68]) few comprehensive studies have been
published from which best practices can be drawn. Perhaps, best stated in [40]:
“In traditional engineering disciplines, the value of learning from failure is well
understood, and one could argue that without this feedback loop, software engi-
neering cannot properly claim to be an engineering discipline at all. Of course,
many companies track failures in their own software, but there is little attention
paid by the field as a whole to historic failures and what can be learned from
them”.
As in any scientific field it is necessary to use empirical data to investigate theories,
determine if and when observed phenomena occur, and update the theories accordingly. In
fact, our earlier work showed that in cases when the assumptions made by architecture based
software reliability models hold true the models make reasonable reliability estimates, but
when the assumptions do not hold true, reliability estimates tend to be over optimistic [31].
Thus, not considering the validity of assumptions and heuristics can create a false confidence.
We conducted a systematic comprehensive study of faults, failures and fixes for a large
safety–critical NASA mission. The mission was implemented through Computer Software
Configuration Items (CSCIs), which span a wide range of applications from command and
control; power generation, distribution, storage, and management of supporting utilities;
and failure detection, isolation, and recovery; to human-computer interfaces and scientific
research support. The CSCIs represent large scale software components, and thus are re-
ferred throughout the work as components. To the best of our knowledge, this dissertation
represents the first effort to complete the link from the faults that cause failure (potential
or observed) to the fixes implemented to prevent the failure from (re)occurring. Although,
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our work encompasses some of the work conducted by others, we analyzed a much larger set
of fault, failure and fix features than any other study and maintained the link from faults to
failure to fixes throughout the work. By qualitatively and quantitatively analyzing different
features of faults, failures and fixes we improve the empirical knowledge by identifying com-
mon patterns and unusual dependencies that can be used to guide fault prevention, detection
and removal efforts.
This work proceeds by introducing the research approach, goals and specific research
questions investigated in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 a detailed review of related work is
presented and our unique contributions are explicitly stated in Chapter 4. The details of the
case study as well as the data used are given in Chapter 5. Chapters 6 through 9 contain
the detailed assessment analysis. Chapter 6 includes the exploration of individual fault and
failure features; chapter 7 covers the analysis of pairwise correlation between pairs of fault
and failure features; chapter 8 presents the analysis of the features across releases (i.e., n to
n+1) and within (i.e., pre to post) releases; and chapter 9 concludes the assessment part with
the analysis of fixes made to correct the faults that caused failures. Finally, in Chapter 10
the possibility of predicting features of fixes based on fault and failure features is discussed.
Lastly, we address the threats to the validity of our work in Chapter 11 and then provide
some concluding remarks and directions for future research in Chapter 12.
5
Chapter 2
Research Approach and Goals
Although it is clear that detailed empirical studies of faults and failures can benefit the
software engineering community, such studies are rare. Perhaps best stated by [54], the lack
of studies is in part due to the facts that:
1. Locating and gaining access to empirical fault and failure data is difficult, especially
for large, real-world, complex systems.
2. Collecting and analyzing the necessary data is very time consuming, and therefore can
be quite expensive.
3. Finding qualified personnel with the appropriate skills to perform the studies is often
difficult.
Additionally, we point out that the process of linking faults to failures is often a chal-
lenging, time-consuming task. Furthermore, many organizations are reluctant to make fault
and failure data available for research and publication. However, the ultimate goal of quality
assurance is to improve overall software quality, thus, it is essential that we as a community
overcome these challenges and learn from empirical fault and failure data. Whenever possi-
ble theories should be tested on empirical data to determine if and when observations hold
true, so that the theories can be updated accordingly. By exploiting what is learned we can
improve the software development processes as well as the products they produce.
Clearly, the best way to learn from faults and failures is to study real world instances
of each, including the relationships the fixes implemented to correct the faults and prevent
failures. As suggested in [46], “bug reports from testing and operations are a rich, under-used
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source of information about requirements”. We believe the applicability of bug reporting
databases (and other change tracking systems) is much broader as these systems provide
valuable sources of information that hold high potential for conducting empirical fault and
failure studies, especially when faults and failures are linked to fixes. Thus, we conduct a
case study based on the change tracking system used by a large NASA mission (which is
implemented through multiple large scale components) to explore different features of faults,
failures and fixes.
The change tracking system provided a rich data set of faults, failures and fixes captured
in software change requests (SCRs) and changes notices (CNs). Specifically, non-conformance
SCRs, which were filed when non-conformance to a requirement was observed (e.g., through
analysis activities, testing, in operation, etc.), represent failures (i.e., observed as well as
potential failures) and describe the associated faults. CNs were used to track the changes
made to address the non-conformance reported, that is, fix the fault(s) that caused the
failure (or those that could potentially lead to a failure). Hence, considering these two types
of change tracking documents together allowed us to link failures to the faults that caused
them and to the changes made to implement fixes.
Overall, the goal was to characterize common patters and unusual dependencies in the
data in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of quality assurance practices. To-
wards this end, we systematically investigated and characterized faults, failures and fixes
based on detailed analysis of several features extracted from the change tracking database
for multiple artifact releases of the NASA mission. Specifically, we investigated in the fol-
lowing fault, failure, and fix features:
1. Fault Type - the type of fault that caused the failure (e.g., incorrect requirements,
coding faults, procedural non-compliance etc.).
2. Verification Activity - the verification activity taking place when the fault was detected
or the failure was exposed (e.g., inspections, audits, testing, etc.). The verification
activity also includes ”on-orbit”, which represents the cases where failures actually oc-
curred on-orbit because the verification activities in place did not expose the associated
faults pre-release.
3. Severity - the potential or actual impact of the failure on the system (e.g. safety-critical
or non-critical).
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4. Failed Component - the component (i.e., CSCI) the non-conformance was reported
against.
5. Release - the software release of the failed component. It should be noted the compo-
nents followed an iterative development process.
6. Investigation Effort - the hours spent investigating the observed non-conformance and
filing the SCR.
7. Fixed Artifacts - the artifacts affected by the changes made to fix faults and prevent
failures from (re)occurring (e.g., requirements documents, design documents, code,
etc.).
8. Fixed Components - the components (i.e., CSCIs) affected by the changes made to fix
faults and prevent failures from (re)occurring. It should be noted that, in general, the
failed component (i.e., the component that exhibited non-conformance) was fixed, but
in very few cases it may not have been fixed at all.
9. Fix Effort - the total effort in hours spent making the changes need implement the fix
per individual failure.
10. Status - the current status of the SCR, that is, open, closed or no action required.
Analyzing these features allowed us to explore the existence of high priority classes of
failures, that is, failures that are of utmost importance to prevent. Specifically we are
interested in (1) safety–critical failures (i.e. failures that present a risk to human life [51]),
(2) operational failures (i.e., post–release failures, which are typically more expensive to fix
and in the case of the NASA mission can cause the loss of the mission), (3) failures whose
faults required a relatively high effort to fix and (4) failures caused by dominating fault
types. By considering the relationships amongst features of faults, failures and fixes we can
help prevent the high priority failures. For example, if we can identify the types of faults
that often lead to post–release failures (or safety-crtical failures), we can direct developers to
focus on preventing the insertion on these types of faults and/or focus activities on detecting
them pre-release.
By conducting and publishing this analysis we are taking a step toward a better under-
stand of the complex relationships between faults, failures and fixes. Further, by exploiting
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the relationships between features we aim to decrease the time and effort required for future
fixes by helping to identify the artifacts that need to be fixed, components that need be fixed.
Thus, the study was conducted in two parts: assessment and prediction. First, we carefully
assessed all available data to defined the fault, failure and fix features discussed above, and
then qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed each. It should be noted that the detailed
assessment was conducted by our independent research group, but was continually reviewed
by and updated based on comments from NASA personnel involved in the development,
and verification and validation activities associated with the mission. Once the assessment
was completed, we explored the ability of making predictions to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of quality assurance efforts.
The specific research questions explored in this dissertation are introduced next. Research
Questions RQ1 through RQ4 are relative to the assessment phase of our study; the results
are presented in Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively. The set of research questions RQ5,
which relate to the prediction phase of the study, are presented in Chapter 10.
2.1 Assessment
We began our analysis by focusing on each fault and failure feature individually in order
to reveal common trends. Specially, we explored the following sets of research questions:
RQ1: How are failures distributed across the values of each feature (i.e., fault type, verifi-
cation activity, and severity level)?
A. Are some fault types more common than others?
B. Do some verification activities detect more faults than others?
C. Are some severity levels more common than others?
D. Is the effort spent reporting failures uniform per component?
As mentioned earlier, we investigated fault types because identifying the most common
types of faults would help developers determine which types of fault they should focus on
preventing and/or eliminating. Looking at the distribution of failures across verification
activities allowed us to distinguish post–release failures from failures observed during de-
velopment and testing and also consider which types of activities most commonly revealed
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faults and/or failures. Studying the severity allowed us to distinguish safety-critical failure
from non-critical failures. Thus, the fault type, verification activity and severity features al-
lowed us to focus on the high priority failure classes mentioned earlier. Exploring the effort
spent reporting the failures can be useful with respect to seeing how effort is spread across
the components.
Once the individual features were analyzed, we looked at the relationship(s) amongst
different features to identify trends that could be used to update verification practices in
order to improve effectiveness and efficiency. In particular, we explored pairwise relationships
to answer the following research questions:
RQ2: Does pairwise correlation exist between fault and failure features?
A. Are certain verification activities more likely to detect certain types of faults? Fur-
ther, are failures exposed during post–release activities (i.e. operational failures)
caused by the same types of faults as failures exposed pre-release?
B. Are certain types of faults more likely to result in safety–critical failures?
C. Which verification activities reveal safety–critical failures?
Clearly, the identification of verification activities that are likely to detect common fault
types would be beneficial for planning verification activities and allocating resources. Fur-
ther, quality assurance practices could also be tailored to focus on activities that are most
likely to reveal safety–critical failures or operational failures and/or prevent fault types that
may be more heavily associated with such failures.
Based on the fact that as software evolves, software reliability growth typically occurs
and hence fault and failure behavior changes we investigated trends across releases as quality
assurance practices may need to be reassessed and updated throughout the life-cycle. This
is especially interesting for the NASA mission which used an iterative development process,
meaning functionality was often added in each release. Thus, the following set of research
questions is focused on exploring the distribution of the number of failures and the trends in
fault types, activities, and severity levels within individual releasees (i.e., from development
and testing to on–orbit) and across multiple releases (i.e., from one release to the next).
RQ3: Do trends differ within releases or from one release to the next?
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A. What is the distribution of the number of failures across releases? Further, is
there a relationship between the number failures reported across releases, that is,
between release n and release n + 1?
B. Does the contribution of dominating fault types change as the software matures
across releases? Specifically, do dominating faults types change from one release
to the next?
C. Are certain releases more likely to exhibit on–orbit failures? Further, is there
a relationship between the number of failures reported during development and
testing and the number of failures reported on–orbit?
D. Does the severity level of failures change as the software matures both within and
across releases? Specifically, are safety–critical failures more likely to occur in
earlier or later releases?
Knowing how failures distribute across releases can be helpful to project managers when
scheduling software engineers’ tasks assignments and time allotments. Additionally, if possi-
ble, identifying which parts of the system are likely to be responsible for failures in operation
or even for failures in the next release would allow resources to be more efficiently focused.
Once the faults and failure were characterized we explored the changes made to fix the
faults and prevent failures from (re)occurring. First, characterized the fixes in terms of the
fixed artifacts, the fixed components and the effort required to implement the fixes. Then,
we explored how fault and failure features where related features of fixes. Specifically, we
investigated the following research questions to complete the assessment phase:
RQ4: What are the common characteristics of fixes? And, how do features of fault and
failures relate to features of fixes?
A. Which components are affected most often by fixes? Further, are any groups of
components commonly fixed together?
B. Which types of software artifacts were fixed most often?
C. Is there any relation between the type of fault that causes a failure and the types
of artifacts that need to be fixed?
D. Is there any relation between the verification activity that revealed the fault(s)
and the types of artifacts fixed?
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E. In terms of the artifacts fixed, do safety–critical failures differ from non-critical
failures?
F. Is the effort spent implementing fixes uniform per SCR? per component? If not,
what are the common characteristics of fixes that required the most effort?
2.2 Prediction
Once the fault, failure and fix features were characterized we explored the possibility of
predicting features of fixes based on the features describing failures and the associated faults.
Specifically, we explored the following research questions:
RQ5: Can traditional machine learning algorithms be used to predict features of fixes
based on fault and failure features entered in a non-conformance SCR?
A. Can we predict the types of artifacts that will need to be fixed?
B. Can we predict the components that will need to be fixed?
C. Can we predict the amount of effort required to implement the fix?
D. Can high priority failures classes be characterized by common features?
If possible, predictions with respect to the components and types of artifacts to be fixed
would clearly be useful in increasing the efficiency of addressing future SCRs by pointing
out what needs to be fixed and where. Additionally, the ability to predict the amount of
effort require would be useful for planning and adjusting resources, which would be help for
developers better estimate expected effort and allocate resources for the continued sustained
engineering of the mission or perhaps for a similar missions. Finally, characterizing high
priority failures classes would help identify common patterns and unusual dependencies in
the fault and failure features associated with safety-critical failures, on-orbit failures, failures
caused by common fault types, and failures that were associated with a high fix effort which




In this chapter we review the related work. For clarity, the discussion is split into multiple
sections. In Section 3.1 we discuss works that characterize faults and failures (e.g., by fault
type, life-cycle phase the failure occurred in or the fault was detected in, etc.). In Section
3.2 we discuss works that consider how fault and failure data changes across releases, most
of which focus on predicting fault proneness. In section 3.3 we review works that considered
architectural prosperities of the software for prediction purposes as our results show that
fixes were related to the software architecture. In Section 3.4 we discuss works which use
data from change tracking repositories to make predictions aimed at improving the process
of fixing faults. Finally, in section 3.5 we discuss works that focused on predicting the effort
associated with fixes. Each section provides and explanation of the relevance of the works
discussed to our work; our unique contributions are discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1 Classification of faults and failures
A number of studies by Christmansson and Chillarege [19], Duraes and Madeira [22],
Leszak et al. [43], Lutz and Mikulski [45], and Yu [68] are related to our work because
they focus on characterizing and classifying fault and/or failure data. These studies differ in
terms of their main goals, the systems studied, and variables explored. None of these works
considered the evolution of software across multiple releases.
The goal of the study conducted by Christmansson and Chillarege in [19], as well as the
study by Duraes and Madeira in [22] was to discover representative fault types to be used
for fault injection at the source code level. To do so, each study used the Orthogonal Defect
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Classification (ODC) to classify the fault types; Christmansson and Chillarege studied 408
defect reports from an IBM operating system and Duraes and Madeira studied 668 faults
from twelve open source in [22]. Despite the vast differences in the systems studied in each
work the distribution of faults across ODC defect types was very similar. It should be noted
that both studies limited the analysis to faults directly related to the code and assumed the
specification and requirements were correct. Neither [19] nor [22] explored how faults were
discovered or the consequences of the corresponding failures. In [22] the ODC schema was
extended to further classify faults based on whether the fault represented something missing,
wrong or extraneous.
Leszak et al. analyzed a random sample of defect (i.e., fault and failure) modification
requests (MRs) (i.e., 427 MRs total) from a network element of an optical transmission in
[43]. The MRs were analyzed based on fault types, fault locations, root causes, triggers, the
phase of the life cycle in which the fault was introduced, and the phase in which the fault was
detected. The percentage of modification requests to fall into each classification category
and the effort associated with each category were studied. The authors found that the same
types of implementation faults dominated the entire sample, as well as the post–release
sub–sample. Additionally, the majority of faults were detected during system integration.
Furthermore, it was shown that addressing the implementation faults (which likely included
coding faults and integration faults) consumed 75% of the total effort. However, contrary to
the popular belief the data shows that faults injected during requirements phases on average
do not require much more effort to fix than others.
In a study conducted by Yu, analysis of the phase when faults were introduced into a
switching telecommunication software showed that nearly half of the 600 faults were related
to coding faults and the majority of them could have been prevented [68]. A lower-level
examination of the coding faults revealed that over 50% of them were related to logic,
maintainability and interfaces. Based on additional, detailed root cause analysis the team
identified and then implemented several countermeasures by developing specific coding fault
prevention and inspection guidelines.
Both Leszak [43] and Yu [68] clearly showed that later life cycle faults must be addressed
as they account for a significant percentage of faults and require a significant amount of effort
to correct. The usefulness of such analysis can be seen in [68] as the release following the
institution of the guidelines was one of the best released by the organization. Specifically,
the number of faults delivered to the customer decreased by 35%, lowering the impact of the
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major actionable root causes by 60%.
The study conducted by Lutz and Mikulski in [45] was focused on safety–critical (i.e.
high severity) post–launch anomalies of seven unmanned NASA spacecrafts. An ODC based
technique was used to classify 199 safety–critical anomalies and the following attributes
were considered: defect (i.e., fault) type, verification activity that was taking place when
the anomaly was observed, trigger (i.e., the condition(s) that had to exist for the anomaly
to surface), and target (i.e., the entity that was fixed). Descriptive statistics were used to
explore the association between defect (i.e., fault) type and trigger, and also between target
and trigger. The only formally tested hypotheses were with respect to the distribution of
anomalies across categories for each of the ODC attributes studied. As expected, results
showed that anomalies were not uniformly distributed across the categories of any attribute.
Although correlation between some attributes was suggested by graphs and discussed in the
paper, it was not quantified and the statistical significance was not explored.
3.2 Analysis within and across releases
Another group of papers related to our study, although with different goals, explored
fault and/or failure characteristics across at least two releases by Fenton and Ohlsson in
[26], Andersson and Runeson in [1], Ostrand, Weyuker and Bell in [54], [55], [56], and [9],
Biyani and Santhanam in [11], and Pighin and Marzona in [58].
We start the discussion with a well known study conduced by Fenton and Ohlsson, which
focused specifically on quantitative analysis of fault and failure data [26] for a large Ericsson
telecommunications application. The authors empirically investigated several basic software
engineering hypotheses related to: the Pareto distribution of faults, the use of size metrics
for fault prediction, and the use of fault data to make predictions both across test phases
and from pre– to post–release. The authors claimed the most surprising result found was the
strong evidence that most fault prone modules pre–release are among the least fault prone
post–release. No evidence was found to support the use of popular complexity metrics to
predict fault density.
A literal replication of Fenton and Ohlsson study [26] was recently conducted by An-
dersson and Runeson in [1]. The same hypotheses were explored on three separate software
development projects from a large telecommunications company, two of which were applica-
tion projects developing consumer artifacts and one was an internal platform project. While
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the majority of the results were fairly consistent, the result related to the relationship be-
tween pre– and post–release faults was not. Thus, unlike Fenton and Ohlsson [26], Andersson
and Runeson [1] found that a high incidence of pre–release faults implied a high incidence
of post–release faults. Even more, the claim was supported with formal statistical analysis
based on Pearson correlation coefficient, which showed moderate positive correlation. It
should be noted Anderson and Runeson did not discuss the choice of Pearson correlation
coefficient as a measure of correlation or its underlying assumptions.
The set of closely related studies conducted by Ostrand, Weyuker and Bell in [54], [55],
[56], and [9] analyzed software faults from multiple large industrial systems. In [54], Ostrand
and Weyuker explored ways to identify fault prone files by studying the distribution of
faults, the relation between size metrics and fault density, and the persistence of faults both
pre– to post–release and from one release to the next for twelve releases of an inventory
control system. Similarly to Fenton and Ohlsson[26], the results suggested that the files
that contained the most pre–release faults were not the most likely place to find post–release
faults. Severity was considered in [54], but only to a limited extent, that is, evidence of the
Pareto principle was found when analyzing the system by release and severity. Although the
distribution of faults across the life–cycle phases in which faults were detected (which closely
relates to verification activity) was studied, the relationship with severity was not explored.
A few additional releases of the system studied originally by Ostrand and Weyuker in
[54] were considered in [55] to develop a negative binomial regression model. The model used
selected variables from the current release of code (e.g., file size) and previous releases of
the file change history (e.g., number of faults in previous releases, whether the file had been
changed) to predict which files were likely to contain the most faults in the next release.
The authors stated that although they had initially planned to use the severity rating in the
model, it was determined that the ratings were highly subjective and inaccurate.
Later works [56], [9] by the members of the same group tested the accuracy and ap-
plicability of the model by applying it to even more releases of the original case study (an
inventory system totaling 17 releases) and two new systems (i.e., 9 releases of a service provi-
sioning system, and an automated voice response system which followed a continuous release
pattern, without scheduled releases). In each case, the model proved to be quite accurate.
that is, the top 20% of the files identified in each case contained between 73-83% of the faults.
Although Ostrand, Weyuker and Bell (i.e., [55], [56], and [9]) did not specifically explore the
relationship between the number of faults in two successive releases, the successful prediction
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results indicated an existence of some relationship.
Biyani and Santhanam explored the relationship between the number of faults in con-
secutive releases, as well as the relationship between pre– and post–release fault proneness
for four releases of a commercial application in [11]. The results showed that to predict the
number of faults in the current release it was sufficient to consider only the immediately
previous release. With respect to the relationship between pre– and post–release faults the
authors concluded that modules found to be faulty in development were likely to have a high
number of faults remaining in the field, which is consistent with the result found Andersson
and Runeson in [1]. Clearly, the issue of whether there is a positive or negative correlation
between pre– and post–release faults and/or failures is still an open research problem.
Pighin and Marzona investigated fault persistence through software releases using data
from 23 releases of a management application and 15 releases of a medical application in [58].
Unlike Biyani and Santhanam’s work in [11], which dealt with number of faults, this work
used the average fault density at each release to track the fault proneness across releases.
The core result showed that files with an above average fault density in the first release tend
to have higher than average fault densities in later releases. Specifically, 44% of the faulty
files in the first release of the first project and 50% of the faulty files in the first release of
the second project have a fault density 33% higher than the average fault density in later
releases.
Overall for the the works discussed in this section some specifically explored the fault
proneness within individual releases (i.e., pre– and post–release)([11] and [58]), while others
specifically focused on fault-proneness across consecutive releases ([1], [5], [26], [54], [55],[56],
and [9]. Additionally, it should be noted that these studies were conducted at different levels,
that is, [1], [11], and [26] worked at the module level, while [5], [9], [54], [55],[56], and [58]
worked at the file level. Further, none of these works considered fault types or activities (on
a finer granularity than pre– and post–release) and only [54] considered the severity.
3.3 Analysis considering architectural properties
The papers discussed in this section are not tightly related to our work, but have been
included because they incorporated analyses with respect to software architecture and our
assessment of the characteristics of fixes showed the spread of fixes across components was
related to the architecture. Thus, although the goals were quite different some of observations
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are quite relevant.
In [61] Shereshvsky et al. discussed the use of architectural level metrics to represent
quality attributes based on the idea that architectural-level decisions may have a profound
impact on finished software products. The explored metrics were based on coupling and
cohesion of information, data and control flows in software systems; however due to the
infancy of the work no empirical validation was provided. Abdelmoez et al. [2] derived an
analytical formula to estimate change propagation probability at a system level based the
flow of control and the flow of data between components. By comparing the estimated change
propagation matrix to the empirically derived change propagation probability for a JAVA
application it was shown that the formula could be used to accurately compare potential
architectures.
The ability to identify software components that are likely to be fault (or failure) prone
early on is clearly beneficial to managers in terms of project planning and resource allocation,
as accommodations in the budget, schedule, methods used and resources available could be
accurately scheduled as early as possible. Thus, relationships between software design metrics
and fault and/or failure proneness have been explored by numerous researchers.
One of the first studies focused on design metrics was conducted by Zage and Zage
throughout [69], [70], and [71]. The metrics explored included internal design metrics (i.e.,
stress points within functions) and external design metrics (e.g., control flow-in and -out
of functions) extracted from the code. The results showed such metrics could be used to
correctly identify functions that were likely to have faults.
Ohlsson and Alberg [53] conducted a design metrics study where the metrics were ex-
tracted directly from design documents. Based on the Formal Description Language (FDL)
graphs used in the design documentation they were able to build a tool that analyzed the
design documents automatically and thus easily extracted metrics before code was avail-
able. The FDL graphs represented functions and subroutines within modules. The metrics
used were based on direct and indirect measures of the graphs and included derivations of
McCabe’s cyclomatic complexity. By correlating these metrics with the number of failure
reports it was shown that it was indeed possible to build a useful fault-prediction model
before the code was available.
Chiamber and Kremerer [18] developed a set of design metrics specific to object oriented
development methodologies. The six proposed metrics incorporated the experiences of pro-
fessional software developers and were constructed on a firm basis of theoretical concepts
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in measurement and the ontology of objects. The metrics were defined at the class level
and were based on coupling and cohesion. Using two case studies, one from a software
vendor that used object oriented design to development C++ libraries and the other from
a semiconductor manufacturer that used Smalltalk for developing flexible machine control
and manufacturing, the metrics were shown to be useful in terms of representing design
properties, evaluating design decision and focusing resources most effectively.
Since their introduction the metrics defined in [18] have received a vast amount of atten-
tion and exploration. For example, Basili et al. [6] explored the validity of the metrics on
eight different student development efforts of single information management system. The
authors stated that several of the metrics from [18] appeared to be useful for predicting
fault-proneness at the class level during the early phases of the life-cycle. Xu et al. [67]
explored the use of Chidamber and Kremerers [18] metrics to predict the number of defects
expected in a module for a NASA Public Data Set. The results strongly suggested that al-
though some of the metrics from [18] are reliable defect predictors they do not demonstrate
as powerful of an impact as a simple SLOC measure. Xu et al. [67] included a comparison
of the related work on the metrics defined in [18] and showed that although in each case the
explored metrics were found useful results differed across projects.
More recently, architectural based metrics have been used to specifically predict failure
proneness (e.g., in [10], [74], and [75]). Zimmermann and Nagappan studied failure proneness
of Windows Server 2003 based on dependencies between parts of the code and the complexity
of dependency graphs [74], and [75]. The goal was to help managers choose parts of the
system for the purpose of allocation of quality assurance resources. The results showed that
models accounting for architectural dependencies did better at predicting post-release failures
than models based on the typical complexity metrics. Bird et al. [10] focused on predicting
failure proneness post-release based on the dependency structure between components and
tasks assignments (i.e., who worked on which component how much). The prediction models
were evaluated on Windows operating system Vista and multiple versions of the integrated
development environment Eclipse. The results showed that these models performed as well
as, if not better than models that did not consider the architectural dependency structure
and task assignments.
In [41] and [73] models based on design metrics were compared with those based on code
metrics as well as those based on combinations of code and design metrics. Jiang et. al [41]
compared design and code metrics for 13 NASA datasets and found that the model that
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combine all metrics (design and code) did slightly better than models based on code metrics
only, which did slightly better than models based on design metrics only. Similarly, Zhoa et
al. [73] (which only considered one date set) found that both design and code metrics were
correlated with the number of faults, but using the metrics together led to improvement in
predictions.
Similarly to works discussed in this section we incorporated metrics representing the ar-
chitecture into our prediction models. However, unlike these works, we consider architectural
properties in addition to features of faults and failures.
3.4 Predictions using change request data
It will always remain true that no matter how successful the community becomes at
removing faults some faults will indeed remain, which is why we focused on using data
from change requests to help handle similar requests more efficiently and effectively in the
future. Thus, in this section we discuss works which use data reported through bug reports,
modification requests or change requests for predictions, including works conducted in [16]
and [17] by Canfora and Cerulo, in [47] by Malin, and in [62] by Sheriff et al.
In [16] and [17], Canfora and Cerulo used historical change data stored in open source
software repositories to help determine which files needed to be changed for new change
requests and which developer was best equipped to make the changes. The hypothesis was
that data stored in software repositories served as good descriptors of how past change
requests have been resolved. The approach was based largely on textual similarity and
used the textual descriptions of change requests to index developers and source files. An
information retrieval method was applied to retrieve candidate developers and source files
based on the textual description for a new change request. The accuracy of predicting which
files needed to be changed as well as who was best equipped to make those changes varied
greatly for different systems. The Firefox Mozilla [50] the web browse and three desktop
applications from the kde open-source project [44] were used as case studies. With respect to
files to be changed the first file identified to require a change was indeed changed 36%, 78%,
45%, 39% of the time depending on the system. Additionally, the first developer predicted
as the best developer to handle the job was actually the developer that handled the change
request between 30-50% of the time for kde studies system, and only 10-20% for Mozilla
Firefox.
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In [47] Malin explored the use of text mining and tagging of NASA software change re-
quests to help find “more reports similar to this one” during in-flight anomalies. The authors
used hierarchical aerospace ontologies of concepts and nomenclature to identify problem type
and/or equipment type tags rather than using traditional keyword searches or data mining
techniques, which often fail on natural-language text fields. Due to its infancy, limited results
are publicly available.
In [62], Sheriff et al. proposed a methodology for determining the effects of changes made
to correct failures and prioritize regression test cases needed to ensure fixes were correct
and complete. Data from change requests was complied into a matrix that represented
historically-based usage relationships between files. Clusters of files that historically changed
together were generated by using singular value decomposition on the matrix. By combining
the clusters with test case information the authors were able determine whether additional
regression tests were necessary. It was found that additional regression test were necessary
50% of the time, and test predicted to have the highest priority (in terms of re-running tests)
found a fault 60% of the time.
In summary, it is clear that data stored on change request repositories can be useful for
making predictions. Unlike, [16], [17], [47] and [62] we used change request data to predict
the artifacts fixed, the components fixed and the effort associated with implementing the
fixes, features that none of these works considered.
3.5 Predicting the effort associated with fixes
In this section we discuss works that use features of faults, failures and/or change requests
to predict the effort associated with fixes, including works by Evanco [24], Zeng and Rine
[72], Weib et al. [65], Song [63], and Mockus [48]. It should be noted that these works specif-
ically considered the predictions with respect to correction effort. For more typical effort
estimation, that is, with respect to project development, schedule an/or budget the reader
is referred to [42]. Additionally, with respect to the numerous research efforts focussed on
fault and failure proneness prediction, we note that a good survey was recently published by
Arisholm et al., and review [5] in this section as it was useful for interpretation of prediction
results.
The study conducted by Arisholm et al. in [5] reviewed multiple fault-proneness studies
and clearly showed that no single modeling technique constantly performs well across all
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projects. Further, the authors compared several ways of assessing the performance of the
models and found that the best performing models differed based on evaluation criteria. Ar-
isholm et al. proposed a new evaluation criteria, cost effectiveness (CE), which considers the
cost of inspecting a file based on fault-proneness predictions. However, similarly to the more
traditionally used methods for comparisons between models (e.g., receiver operator curves
(ROC)), the CE measure is useful for binary-class problems, but for multi-class problems it
would be considerably more difficult to conceptualize and interpret the results.
Evanco analyzed the fault correction effort for 509 faults detected during unit testing
and system/acceptance testing for three Ada projects in [24]. Effort was classified in four
categories: less than or equal to one hour, greater than one hour but less than or equal to one
(8 hour) work day, greater than one day but less than or equal to 3 days, and greater than
3 days. The faults were classified based on the number of software components involved,
the complexity of the components, and the testing phase in which the faults occurred. The
analysis clearly showed that fault correction often involves examining and fixing more than
one component. Using an ordered response model the effort was expressed in terms of a log-
linear functional form and fault correction effort were ranked according to expected efforts.
Some interesting results included (1) the indication that the greater the spread of the faults
across components the more effort was required to correct the faults, and (2) faults were
more difficult to isolate during system/acceptance testing than during unit testing.
In [72], Zeng and Rine analyzed fix effort from the NASA IV&V Facility Metrics Data
Program KC1 dataset. The severity of the defect, the mode the system was operating in,
the type of defect (e.g. configuration, design, not a bug etc.), and the number of source
lines of code changed or added were used as input variables to estimate defect fix effort using
dissimilarity matrices and self organizing neural networks. Although the experimental results
indicated good performance for similar software development projects, poorer performance
results were found for project with different development environments.
Weib et al. analyzed 567 issue reports from JBoss [65]. A distance function based on text
similarity was defined using the title and description fields to measure similarity between
issues. Statistical models were used to prediction correction effort for new issues using
a Nearest Neighbor Approach (both with and without thresholds). The most interesting
result showed that the accuracy of prediction varied greatly for different issue types (e.g.,
bugs, feature requests, tasks) and the nearest neighbor approach using thresholds was most
accurate for predicting correction effort for ”bugs”.
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In [63], Song et al. applied association rule mining to NASA’s Software Engineering
Laboratory’s defect data consisting of more than 200 projects over 15 years. Defect asso-
ciations with respect defect isolation effort and defect correction effort were explored. The
attributes considered were defect type and three flags indicating whether the defect was due
to a typographical error, whether code was left out (i.e., an omission error), and/or whether
it was result of an incorrect executable statement (i.e., a commission error). Similarly to [24]
the effort data was classified into 4 categories: less than or equal to one hour, greater than
one hour but less than or equal to one (8 hour) work day, greater than one day but less than
or equal to 3 days, and greater than 3 days. The accuracy of the association rule mining
method was 93.80% predicting defect isolation effort and 94.69% for predicting defect cor-
rection effort, which proved to be significantly better than three other well-known machine
learning methods (i.e., PART, C4.5, and Naive Bayes).
The ability to predict the amount of effort that remained to be spent on a project based
on modification request data was investigated by Mockus et al in [48]. The goal was to
predict the amount and distribution over time of the maintenance effort and repair effort
associated with new features. The authors chose to represent effort in terms of the time from
when the MR was opened to when it was closed due to the difficulty in obtaining actual hours
spent making changes. Although, this study only considers repair effort to a limited extent
(i.e., with respect to new features) the authors claimed the results of applying the model
confirm a fundamental relationship between the new feature and defect repair changes.
Similarly to our work each of these works, our work specifically focused on predicting
effort associated with fixing faults. However, the works in this section did not specifically




Although fault and failure studies are becoming more and more common as both re-
search and practitioner communities recognize the benefits, overall the software engineering
community lacks detailed published empirical studies of large complex real world systems.
The lack of studies is likely due to the facts that locating and gaining access to empirical
fault and failure data can be quite difficult (as many organizations are reluctant to make
fault and failure data available for research), and collecting and analyzing the data is very
time consuming and often requires domain expertise. Even more, associating failures with
the fault(s) that caused them, as well as the fixes made to prevent them from re-occurring
is not straight forward. In fact, some related studies could not differentiate changes made to
fix faults from changes made for enhancements, and those that did relied on assumptions or
heuristics that were not completely justified. To best of our knowledge, this work is unique in
that we analyzed the complete link from the faults that cause failure (potential or observed)
to the fixes implemented to prevent them from (re)occurring.
We present a systematic approach for using information stored in software change requests
to qualify and quantify features of faults, failures, and fixes as well as the relationships
between them. Below we outline our major contributions in relation to the related works
discussed in the previous chapter.
• We analyzed a large sample of over 2,500 software change requests (SCRs) entered for
the purpose of fixing faults throughout the life of 21 components from flight software
of a large, complex, safety–critical NASA mission containing millions of lines of code
in over 8,000 files. In particular, we analyzed the types of faults that caused failures,
the verification activities taking place when the failures were reported, the severity of
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failures, and the investigation effort associated with reporting failures. Additionally,
we explored the software artifacts fixed, the components fixed to correct faults and the
effort required to implement fixes. We measured the statistical association between
each pair of attributes. Since fault type, verification activity, fixed artifacts and fixed
components were based on a nominal scale, and severity was based on an ordinal
scale, we used the χ2 test for the distribution and the non–parametrical contingency
coefficient C as a measure of the correlation between any two attributes. Based on a
stratified random sample, we tested the statistical significance of the results.
– Some of the related works treated only particular attributes or limited the analysis.
Specifically, [19] and [22] were mainly focused on the types of faults appropriate
for fault injection at source code level only, while we explored fault types through
the software life cycle (e.g., requirements, design, coding), as well as the activities
taking place when the failures occurred, the severity of failures, the artifacts fixed
and component(s) fixed. The work conducted in [43] was the only classification
study that explored investigation effort and fix effort, but neither was discussed
in relation to the artifacts fixed or components fixed.
– In general, severity of software failures has rarely been considered in published
literature. In cases when it was considered, it was only to a limited extend. Thus,
in [54], it was shown that the majority of faults that led to high severity failures
were contained in a small portion of the files. In [19] and [45] severity levels were
used as a way to limit the sample. That is, only faults that had an effect on
users were considered in [19], while only post–launch, safety–critical anomalies
were studied in [45]. Our analysis, in part was focused on safety–critical post–
release failures. However, we considered also the bigger picture, that is, faults
and failures that occurred throughout the entire life cycle, with all severity levels.
Analyzing another safety–critical software system based on data from a broader
portion of the life cycle will certainly enhance the empirical knowledge in area.
– Although some of the related work [68], [43], and [45] analyzed combinations of
attributes, they neither quantified the extent of associations between attributes
nor formally tested the statistical significance of the associations. The only for-
mal statistical test was given in [45] with a goal to test whether the number of
anomalies was uniformly distributed across categories for any attribute.
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• We explored the trends of fault type, verification activity, and severity within individual
releases (i.e., pre to post-release) and across multiple releases for a subset of eleven
components, which had sufficient number of non-conformance SCRs and at least two
releases. In addition to studying the trends of fault types, verification activity, and
severity we also explored the raw number of failure within and across releases. For the
number of failures in releases n and n+1 (i.e., across releases) and the number of pre–
release failures and post–release failures (i.e., within individual releases) we used the
Spearman correlation coefficient to quantify the correlation and test for the statistical
significance of the results.
– Related work in this area [54], [55], [56], [9], [58], [26], [1] looked at the relation-
ships between the number of faults or fault density within individual releases (i.e.,
early testing vs. late testing and pre–release vs. post–release) and across multi-
ple releases (typically from one release to the next). It follows that these papers
considered only a limited view on verification activity , in the context of pre– and
post–release. As described in the related work in section 3.1, severity was consid-
ered in a limited context only in [54]. Fault types (overall or their distribution
within and across releases) were not considered in any of these papers.
– Here as well, related works lacked formal statistical methods. The only paper
that did quantify the results statistically was [1]. In particular, the correlation
between pre– and post–release faults and between testing phases was computed
using the Pearson correlation coefficient, without explicitly stating whether the
assumptions required by the Pearson correlation coefficient were valid on the data.
• We also explored the possibility of applying traditional data mining techniques using
fault type, verification activity, severity, investigation effort and architectural metrics
to predict characteristics of fixes, that is, the artifacts to be fixed, the components to
be fixed and the effort required to implement fixes.
– The idea of using change request data to help improve future fixes is relatively
new. Both [16] and [17] as well as the initial work in [47] focused on text-mining
of English language fields describing the requested changes, which varied greatly
from one entry to the next. We focus on using multiple features, some of which
were selected from pre-defined lists and others that were classified from free text
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fields (with assistance from the project personnel). In [16] and [17] the ability
to predict files that need to be changed to address a new change request was
explored; the accuracy of results varied greatly across systems. In [62], change
request data was used for prediction purpose, but their goal was very different
than ours, that is, they focused on prioritizing regression test cases that should
be executed to verify changes. None of these works explicitly considered fault
types, verification activities, severity levels, investigation effort, or architectural
properties; nor did they predict effort required to implement fixes.
– The ability to predict the effort associated with fixes was explored in [24], [72],
[65], and [48], but the features used as input differed. In [24], [48], and [72]
features available after the fix was identified were used as input (i.e., the number
of components involved in [24] and the delta with respect to the number of lines
of code changed in [72] and [48]). In our work, we focus on using only the features
available when the change request was submitted. In [65] predictions were based
on text similarity of titles and descriptions, thus fault type, verification activity
and severity were not considered as input features.
Some of the research questions addressed in this dissertation, to the best of our knowledge,
have not been addressed in the past. These include (1) exploring which verification activities
are most likely to reveal high priority failures (and/or the faults associated with high priority
failures), (2) studying distribution of the fault types, activities, and severity across multiple
releases, (3) predicting features of fixes (i.e., artifact fixed, components fixed, and fix effort)
based only information available when a fault was detected or failure was reported. In
addition, we also addressed research questions that have been addressed in the past (e.g.,
with respect to the number of failures within and across releases). Thus, throughout our
work whenever possible we compare our results with recent related studies in order to explore
the external validity of the study.
In addition to the systematic approach we consider the quantification of the associations
and formal tests of hypotheses, including tests for the statistical significance of the results,
to be an important contribution because using formal statistical tests is not yet a standard
practice in software engineering in general, and in software quality assurance in particular.
The rigorous analysis presented enriches the knowledge related to faults, failures and fixes




In this chapter we introduce the details of the NASA mission used as a case study, includ-
ing the data analyzed. The mission studied was implemented through Computer Software
Configuration Items (CSCIs), which span a wide range of applications from command and
control; power generation, distribution, storage, and management of supporting utilities;
and failure detection, isolation, and recovery; to human-computer interfaces and scientific
research support. The mission is still active and requires sustained engineering. The CSCIs
follow an iterative development process, which means new functionality is often added from
one releases to the next. As mentioned earlier, we refer to CSCIs as components.
The analysis is based on a snap shot of data from the change tracking system provided to
us by the project when the research began. Throughout the analysis, project personnel pro-
vided domain expertise which helped us to select the data sample analyzed, understand the
software in the context of the larger system, and clarify the meaning, usage and relationships
of data fields and values. Their input was invaluable and we are very grateful.
The change tracking system stores Software Change Requests (SCRs) entered by ana-
lysts for one of three reasons (1) non-conformance to a requirement was observed (2) the
implementation of pre-planned updates is being requested or (3) additional functionality is
requested. SCRs are filed at the component level per component release1. Since we were
interested in exploring and characterizing the relationships between faults, failures and fixes
we focused on SCRs entered when non-conformance to a requirement was observed. By defi-
nition non-conformance SCRs represent failures and characterize associated faults. It should
be that some failures have been observed (for example during testing or operation), while
1It should be noted the iterative development of each component is on its own release schedule.
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others were only potential failures that have been prevented from happening by detecting
faults through verification activities (such as analysis, inspection, or testing) and then fix-
ing them pre–release. Throughout the text we use the terms ’non-conformance SCRs’ and
’failures’ interchangeably.
The changes made to correct faults were tracked in the change tracking system through
Change Notices(CNs). Similarly to SCRs, CNs are filed at the component level per com-
ponent release. CNs are consider to be ’child’ documents to their ’parent’ SCRs. Due to
the interdependence of components, each SCR can have multiple children CN documents,
thus, the system allows for the tracking of changes to multiple components in relation single
instances of non-conformance and also to multiple faults within the same component.
To allow better understanding of the data used in this study, we briefly describe the
process followed by the NASA mission for creating and addressing software change requests.
Upon creation of a non-conformance SCR the originator records the component and
release number for which the non-conformance was observed. Additionally, the originator
records how the need for the change was discovered (e.g., inspection, analysis, regression
testing, integration testing, on-orbit, etc.), a textual description of non-conformance, and
the effort spent reporting the problem (which includes any analysis conducted post non-
conformance observance as well as time spent filling out the SCR and in some cases time spent
complying any addition information needed to provide evidence of the non-conformance), as
well as some other mostly clerical information.
Each non-conformance SCR is reviewed by a board to determine whether or not the
observed non-conformance needs to be addressed. If it is deemed the problem needs to be
fixed, the SCR is assigned to an analyst.The analysts also records data in SCR, including
as the source of the failure (selected from a pre-defined list), and the severity of the failure.
Once a solution is identified by the analyst (or in some cases additional software developers)
it must be approved by the board before the fix can be implemented. Upon implementing
fixes analysts record the SCR associated with fix being implemented, a textual descriptions
of the changes being made, the software artifacts changed and the effort spent implementing
the changes. The board must then verifies the fix which lead to the closure of the SCR and
all associated CNs.
Based on the availability of the data (i.e., whether data was available for all consecutive
releases) and some input from project personal we selected 21 components for the analysis,
referred to as components 1 through 21. The 21 components contain millions of lines of code
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in over 8,000 files. The components are arranged in 3-tier hierarchical structure. Component
20 is the single top level component in the hierarchical architecture and is directly connected
to six components, 1, 14, 17, 18, 19, and 21, each of which resides within the second tier
of the architecture. Each of these components connects a group of additional components
to component 20. The components within these groups span the second and third levels of
the architecture. It should be noted that components in one group can only interact with
components in another group through the hierarchical structure, that is, through component
20. The number of release differed per components, ranging from one release to seven releases
(see Table 9.1). Based on an initial review of the data available in the SCRs we removed
SCRs with clearly erroneous data (e.g., missing multiple mandatory fields), SCRs that were
withdrawn by the user, SCRs tagged as duplicates and SCRs tagged as operator errors. This
process resulted in a sample of just over 2,500 SCRs which were entered throughout the life
cycle (e.g., development, testing, and operation) of 21 components over a period of almost
10 years.
Details for each component, including the number of releases, the number of files, source
lines of code, the cumulative number of non–conformance SCRs over all releases, the number
of non-conformance SCRs per file, and the cumulative number of CNs over all releases are
shown in Table 9.1. The distribution of the cumulative number of SCRs for all releases across
components is shown in Figure 5.1. The components are grouped by the number of releases
each has undergone.
As it can be seen from Table 9.1 and Figure 5.1, the size of components and number of
SCRs written against each component differ greatly between components. Component size
ranged from about 27,000 LOC to almost 740,000 LOC; the number of non-conformance
SCRs ranged from 9 to 861; and the number of CNs ranged from 5 to 431. As expected, the
single top-level component (i.e., component 20) was the largest component and had the most
SCRs and the most CNs filed against. It should be noted that component 20, the component
which has a much larger number of failures than any other component (see Figure 8.4), is
significantly larger in terms of number of files than any other component but actually has
less non-conformance SCRs per file than component 1, 15, and 16 (see Table 9.1, column 5).
Additionally, component 20 is the oldest component, and it is the only component at the
top level in the system hierarchy. Therefore, component 20 is a central point of interaction
and communication between all components and hence it makes sense that a larger number
of failures would be associated with component 20.
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# of # of # of non # of non-conf # of
Component releases SLOC files -conf SCRs SCRs per file CNs
1 1 48,910 207 350 1.69 418
2 2 60,386 200 22 0.11 44
3 2 78,854 287 8 0.03 43
4 2 46,657 228 15 0.07 30
5 2 71,953 269 13 0.05 52
6 2 92,978 321 21 0.07 54
7 2 34,938 289 73 0.25 121
8 2 43,012 270 103 0.38 233
9 2 21,266 125 19 0.15 116
10 3 83,134 356 27 0.08 62
11 3 103,145 444 40 0.09 72
12 3 55,475 277 12 0.04 44
13 3 57,800 599 104 0.17 158
14 3 27,940 280 75 0.27 149
15 3 38,882 84 81 1.04 130
16 3 47,541 169 129 0.76 231
17 4 147,520 587 202 0.27 202
18 5 174,614 552 239 0.41 252
19 7 164,419 747 183 0.33 313
20 7 737,504 1368 735 0.54 1430
21 7 74,618 415 104 0.25 120
Total - 2,211,546 8,071 2,558 0.32 3,764
Table 5.1: Details of the 21 components
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of failures across releases
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It should be noted that a review board exists that to verifies the data recorded in SCRs
and CNs in terms of consistency and correctness. The board can make changes to recorded
data as deemed appropriate, which helps ensure the validity and accuracy of the data we
analyze. Additionally, the board must approve any solution before it can be implemented,
which helps ensure that the changes made to software artifacts fix the appropriate faults, or
at minimum prevent the failure from reoccurring through a work around.
Through detailed exploration of fields in the in change tracking database we selected
fields representing features of failures and the associated faults. Specifically, the following
fault and failure features were defined based on fields in the non-conformance SCRs.
• Fault Type - the type of fault that caused the failure (e.g., incorrect requirements,
coding faults, procedural non-compliance etc.) based on the ’source of failure’ field.
• Verification activity - the verification activity taking place when the fault was detected
or failure was exposed (e.g., inspections or audits, testing, etc.) based on the ’discovered
by field’. It should be noted that the all SCRs that were entered based on non-
conformance observed on-orbit are referred to as post-release failures; all other are
referred to pre-release failures.
• Severity - the potential or actual impact of the failure on the system (e.g. safety-critical
or non-critical) based on the ’severity’ field.
• Failed Component - the component (i.e., component) the non-conformance was re-
ported against based on the ’component’ field.
• Release - the software release of the failed component which was also based on the
release numbers included in the ’component’ field .
• Investigation Effort - the time in hours spent post non-conformance observance (which
includes any analysis conducted post non-conformance observance as well as time spent
filling out the SCR and time spent complying any addition information needed to
provide evidence of the non-conformance) based on the ’effort’ field.
For each failure we consider all changes implemented cumulatively across CNs, thus we
defined the following fix features based on fields in CNs.
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• Fixed Artifacts - the types of artifacts affected by the changes made to fix faults and
prevent failures from (re)occurring (e.g., requirements documents, design documents,
code, etc.) based on the ’affect product’ field.
• Fixed Components - the components (i.e., components) affected by the changes made
to fix faults and prevent failures from (re)occurring based on the ’component’ field.
• Fix Effort - the total effort in hours spent making the changes need implement the fix
per individual failure based on the ’effort’ field.




Investigating the Fault and Failure
Features
In this chapter, we present the result of our investigation of fault and failure features,
that is, we explored the first set of research questions:
RQ1: How are failures distributed across the values of each feature (i.e., fault type, verifi-
cation activity, and severity level)?
A. Are some fault types more common than others?
B. Do some verification activities detect more faults than others?
C. Are some severity levels more common than others?
D. Is the effort spent reporting failures uniform per component?
The specifics of each feature and category values used throughout the analysis are de-
tailed in the section that follow. This analysis is based on all 2,558 non-conformance SCRs
associated with the 21 components we studied.
6.1 Fault Type
We started the analysis by exploring the distribution of different types of faults based on
the ‘source of failure’ field in non-conformance SCRs, to answer research question RQ1–A:
RQ1–A: Are some fault types more common than others?
Margaret L. Hamill Chapter 6. Fault and Failures Features 35













Table 6.1: Distribution of fault types
The fault type was assigned by project personnel, based on a pre-defined list of values.
The category values and the percent of SCRs associated with each value are shown in Table
6.1 and Figure 6.1. The most common sources of failures were requirements faults and coding
faults , each contributing to about 35% of the failures. It should be noted that requirements
faults included incorrect requirements, changed requirements, and missing requirements and
coding faults included common coding mistakes such as logical errors, typos etc. The third
most common fault type was data problems , which accounted for 15% of the failures. Data
problems include faults with respect to components (or some case sub-components) inter-
action with shared data (e.g., reading and the reporting instrument values). Surprisingly,
design faults were only associated with 6% of the failures. Design faults include faults
relative to the design of the system (e.g., omission of component interaction in the design
that need for was later realized). The small number of design faults may in part be due
to the iterative development process followed by the mission, which allowed them to work
with out a detailed design document and led to design decisions that were only implemented
in the code. Additionally, 3% of the failures were due to process or procedural issues, 2%
were due to integration faults, and 2% were due to simulation and testing problems or other
problem which were not directly related to the software artifacts being developed. The fault
types was not recorded for only about 1% of the non–conformance SCRs.
The contributions of some of the fault types to the total number of SCRs in the case of
NASA mission, differ significantly from the results of some of the older empirical studies.
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of fault types
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For example, the main conclusion of a study done at TRW [13], which was based on 224
faults, was that design faults outweigh coding faults, 64 percent versus 36 percent. Although
the percentage of coding faults in our case study is rather consistent (i.e., 36%), the design
faults contribute significantly less (i.e., only 6%). Even more, the faults that originated in
the early life cycle (i.e., requirements related and design faults) together are less than 41%,
which is significantly less than 60 – 70% found in [7], [13], [23].
To explore the external validity, in [37] we compared our results related to fault types to
the results of several more recent large scale empirical studies (i.e., [19], [22], [45], [43], [68]).
It appeared that the main results were consistent, regardless of the fact that these studies
were conducted for different reasons, by different groups, and spanned different domains,
implementation languages, development processes and organizations. Specifically, we found
that across all studies the percent of problems reported due to coding, interface, and integra-
tion faults together was approximately the same or even higher than the percent of faults due
to early life cycle activities (i.e., requirements and design). The two main implications of
this finding are as follows: (1) It contradicts the common belief that the majority of faults
are entered during early life cycle activities (e.g., requirements, specification, and design ac-
tivities), which dates back to some of the older empirical studies [7], [13], [23], [28]. (2) The
consistency of results across multiple recent projects (i.e., [19], [22], [45], [43], [68]) suggests
that this trend is likely to be an intrinsic characteristic of software faults and failures, rather
than a project specific characteristic. Clearly, the software engineering field has grown sig-
nificantly over the years and the differences are likely a result of new development processes
and coding languages, as well as the increased complexity and size of software products.
6.2 Verification Activity
Next, we explore verification activities based on the ‘discovered by’ field to answer re-
search question:
RQ1–B: Do some verification activities detect more faults than others?
The ‘discovered by’ field was a free text field that contained short descriptions of the
verification activity taking place when then non-conformance to a requirement was identi-
fied. Entries included ”testing”, ”analysis”, ”integration testing” , ”unit testing”, etc. Each
unique textual description was grouped into one of the following categories based on manual
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of verification activities
analysis of example SCRs and input from project personnel: inspections and audits, analy-
sis1, testing, and other (representing rarely seen entries). In some cases, the discovered by
field contained the value ”on-orbit”, which represents cases where the verification activities
did not successfully reveal the faults during development and testing, thus allowing the fault
to lead to an on-orbit failures. Throughout our work we used the term on-orbit and post-
release interchangeably since on-orbit failures are the only failures that occurred post-release.
All other verification activity values represent non-conformance observed pre-release.
Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of non-conformance SCR discovered through each verifi-
cation activity. It can be seen that almost 50% of the non-conformance SCRs were discovered
during analysis and 38% were discovered during various types of testing. Only 7% were dis-
covered during inspections or audits, and 3% on–orbit. The fact that only 3% of failures
occurred post launch (i.e., the verification activity was on–orbit) shows that the verification
procedures and process in place are very effective at discovering and fixing faults during de-
velopment and testing (i.e., pre–release). Furthermore, the percentage of non–conformance
SCRs entered post–release is comparable or even smaller than in other studies; thus, in [54]
3% of the total faults surfaced post–release and for three large scale systems in [1] between
4% and 10% of the faults were discovered post–release.
It should be noted that we do not conclude that any verification activity did better
or worse than any other verification activity because the information of the relative effort
spent on each verification activity was not available. However, this is a common unknown
1Analysis includes activities such as informal reviews or walkthroughs, which differ from more formal
inspections that follow specified steps and assign specific roles to individual reviewers [52].
Margaret L. Hamill Chapter 6. Fault and Failures Features 39
in studies that explore activities, for example [1], [26], [43], and [45] each looked at activities
but no discussion was provided with respect to the relative effort put forth to complete the
activity.
Additionally, we note the small size of the post-release sample compared to the pre-release
sample. However, a small post-release sample is an inherent characteristic of any high-quality
software project. Thus despite the large difference in sample size we do continually compare
pre- and post-release failures, but remind the reader to keep the sample size in mind.
6.3 Severity
The NASA mission kept track of the severity level for each non-conformance SCRs to
capture the impact of each potential or observed failure. This allowed us to explore the
following research question:
RQ1–C: Are some severity levels more common than others?
Severity values were assigned by project personnel from a pre-defined list with the fol-
lowing values:
• Sev 1 represents failures which would result in loss of a safety–critical function.
• Sev 1N are those problems which would be Sev 1 but an established reasonable mission
procedure precludes any operational scenario in which the problem might occur.
• Sev 2 represents failures which could results in loss of a critical mission support capa-
bility.
• Sev 2N are those problems which would be Sev 2 but an established reasonable mission
procedure precludes any operational scenario in which the problem might occur.
• Sev 3 are failures perceivable by an operator that is neither Sev 1 or Sev 2.
• Sev 4 represents a discrepancy not perceivable to the flight software user and usually
involves an insignificant violation of flight software requirements.
• Sev 5 is condition not perceivable to the flight software user and usually is the case
where flight software requirements are not violated, but maybe a programming stan-
dard is violated.
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For the purpose of our analysis, we group the severity levels used by the project into
two categories: safety–critical (Sev 1, Sev 1N, Sev 2, and Sev 2N) and non-critical (Sev 3,
Sev 4, and Sev 5). Thus, we found that Safety–critical failures were rare. Overall, across
all 2,558 failures, less than 9% were classified as safety–critical; 64%of the total number of
failures were classified as non-critical, and about 27% of the total number of failures were
unclassified (i.e., no severity has been assigned). Although safety–critical failures are rare
fixing them has a high priority as they can lead to unacceptable consequences, which is
why we choose to characterize them. It should be noted that the sample size of safety-
critical failures is significantly smaller than the sample size of non-critical failures, which is
an inherent characteristic of any high-quality safety-critical software project.
6.4 Investigation Effort
Analysts record the time spent from the observance of non-conformance through the
competition of the submitted SCR. In some cases, this time period simply includes the time
spent filing the SCR, while in others it includes additional time spent gathering evidence of
the non-conformance to be presented to the board (e.g., re-run test cases, building data files,
etc.). Based on the effort fields we explored the following research question:
RQ1–D: Is the effort spent reporting failures uniform per component?
Of the 2,558 non-conformance SCRs, 99% recorded the investigation effort for a cumu-
lative effort across all components and all SCRs of over 15,000 hours. Figure 6.3 shows
the histogram of the investigation effort per failure; effort is shown on a the y axis using
logarithmic scale. The median report effort per SCR was 2 hours and values ranged from 0
to 500 hours (less than 0.5% reported 0 hours). By sorting SCRs based on report effort we
found evidence of the Pareto principle, that is, 20% of SCRs accounted for 77% of the total
effort spent reporting the SCRs, which indicates a very skewed distribution. In fact 80% of
SCRs required one hour or less to report.
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Figure 6.3: Investigation effort histogram
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Chapter 7
Pairwise Associations of Fault and
Failure Features
In this chapter we study the associations between pairs of the features explored in Chapter
6. The goal was to identify correlations between features that could be used to improve fault
prevention and elimination methods and/or the process of resolving failures. Specifically, we
explore the second set of research questions:
RQ2: Does pairwise correlation exist between fault and failure features?
A. Are certain verification activities more likely to detect certain types of faults? Fur-
ther, are failures exposed during post–release activities (i.e. operational failures)
caused by the same types of faults as failures exposed pre-release?
B. Are certain types of faults more likely to result in safety–critical failures?
C. Which verification activities reveal safety–critical failures?
Based on the fact that we want to measure the association between the values of two fea-
tures we used statistical tests including the statistical significance to formalize the observed
results. In order to be able to determine the significance of the results of any statistical test,
one needs to use a random sample from a given population. For all statistical tests in this
chapter we selected a random sample of failures (i.e., SCRs entered due to non–conformance
with a requirement). To ensure that the relative contribution of each component to the
overall sample of failures is preserved, we conducted stratified random sampling. In partic-
ular, we randomly selected half of the failures from each component. In the case where a
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component had an odd number of failures associated with it, we rounded up. Hence, our
random sample consists of N = 1, 436 failures. For each feature considered in our work, we
checked to ensure that the trends seen in the random sample accurately represent those seen
in the population. It should be emphasized that the stratified random sample was only used
for the statistical tests. The figures and observations presented always represent the entire
sample of 2,558 failures.
7.1 Background on Contingency Coefficient
Each feature (i.e., fault type, verification activity, severity) was considered to be a random
variable. For any two random variables, X and Y , where n is the number of categories in
X and m is the number of categories in Y , we explore whether the distribution of failures
across the m categories of Y was the same for each of the n samples (i.e., categories) in X .
For example, for RQ2–A we tested whether the distribution of n types of faults is the same
across m different activities. In order to test whether or not the n samples come from the
same distribution, we built a m x n contingency table using the observed frequencies for
each pair of categories, and then calculated the standard χ2 statistic which can be shown
to be approximated by a chi–square distribution with (m − 1)(n − 1) degrees of freedom.
It should be noted that the χ2 test is applicable to data in a contingency table only if the
expected frequencies are sufficiently large. Specifically, it is commonly accepted that for the
contingency tables with degrees of freedom grater than one, as suggested by [20], χ2 statistics
may be used if no cell has an expected frequency less than 1 and fewer than 20% of the cells
have an expected frequency less than 5. If these requirements are not met by the data in the
form in which they were originally collected, categories must be combined in a meaningful
way in order to increase the expected frequencies in various cells.
Once the χ2 statistic has been calculated, we can determine the probability under the
null hypothesis (i.e., that the distribution of failures across the m categories in Y is the same
for each of the n samples (categories) of X) that a value as large as the calculated χ2 value is
obtained. If the probability is equal to or less than the significance level α (for our purpose
α = 0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected. The fact that the distribution of failures across
the m categories differs significantly for the n samples suggests that there is some correlation
between the two variables. Therefore, we also measure the extent of the correlation between
the two variables. The null hypothesis in this case, would state that there is no relation
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between the two variables and any correlation observed in the sample is due to chance.
In this chapter we use the contingency coefficient C as a measure of correlation, since
it is uniquely useful in cases when the information about at least one of the features is
categorical (i.e., given on a nominal scale). In out case, the fault type and the verification
activity features were based on the nominal scale, while the severity feature was based on an
ordinal scale. The contingency coefficient C does not require underlying continuity for the
various categories used to measure either one or both features. Even more, the contingency
coefficient has the same value regardless of how the categories are arranged in the rows and






where N is the total number of observations [60].
It is important to note that, unlike the other measures of correlation, the maximum value
of C is not equal to 1; rather, it depends on the size of the table. Specifically, the maximum










where m is the number of rows and n is the number of columns in the contingency table.
Hence, even small values of C often may be evidence of statistically significant correlation
between variables. Further, C values for contingency tables with different sizes are not
directly comparable. However, by normalizing C with the corresponding Cmax as in equation
(7.3), we ensure that the range will be between 0 and 1, and hence, C∗ values for different
sized tables can be compared in terms of the measured correlation with respect to the
maximum correlation possible [12]
C∗ = C/Cmax. (7.3)
Since the test of significance for the contingency coefficient C is based solely on the
χ2 statistics, it follows that if the null hypothesis that the n samples come from the same
distribution is rejected, than the calculated C value will be significant. Of course, calculating
the values of C and C∗ allows us to compare the extent of correlation for different pairs of
features.
Throughout following sections we explore the pairwise relationships amongst fault types,
detection activities, and severities.
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7.2 Fault Type and Verification Activity
Surely, if we can determine which activities are most effective for revealing common
faults types, we should be able to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of verification and
validation processes. Hence, we started the pairwise analysis by investigating the relationship
between the type of fault that caused the failure and the verification activity being performed
when the non–conformance SCR was reported (i.e., the failure was observed). Our goal was
to explore whether certain types of faults are more likely to be discovered (i.e., associated)
with certain types of activities, that is, research question:
RQ2–A: Are certain verification activities more likely to detect certain types of
faults? Further, are failures exposed during post–release activities (i.e. opera-
tional failures) caused by the same types of faults as failures exposed pre-release?
For this purpose, we formally test the following null hypothesis:
H10: The distribution of failures across detection activities is the
same for all types of faults.
As described earlier, to ensure the χ2 statistic would be reasonably accurate we had to
combine categories for each feature so that the expected frequencies in combined cells satisfy
the requirements as suggested in [20]. Clearly, it is important that these groupings make sense
from a software engineering perspective and do not hide important categories. Hence, based
on discussions with the project team members, we ended up with the following categories for
activities: analysis, inspection/audit, testing (which included all types of testing activities),
on–orbit and other (which included simulation, ‘n/a’, and the original ‘other’ category from
Figure 6.2).
With respect to fault type categories for the purpose of using the χ2 test we have the
following categories: requirement faults, design faults, coding faults, interface & integra-
tion faults (which includes ‘integration faults’ and ‘data problems’ from Figure 6.1), and
other (which includes ‘procedural problems’, ‘process problems’, ‘fabrication/manufacturing
faults’, ‘complier/linker/software development or testing tool errors’, ‘i/o problem’, ‘simu-
lation problem’, and ‘not given’ from Figure 6.1). It should be noted that all categories
associated with the newly formed fault type category other are not directly related to the
software artifact.
Based on the 5 x 5 contingency table we calculated χ2 = 87.76, which has a probability
of less than 0.001 under that null hypothesis. Hence, we reject H10 at α = 0.05 significance
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level in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the distribution of failures across activities
is not the same for each fault type. We then calculated C = 0.25, Cmax = 0.89, and
C∗ = 0.28. Although, the correlation is weak, based on the fact that the probability of
obtaining χ2 = 87.76 is less than 0.001 which is less than α, we know that the correlation
between the verification activity and fault type attributes is in fact statistically significant.
This result, in other words, suggests that certain activities are more likely to detect failures
caused by certain type of faults. However, the fact that the correlation is weak reminds us
that each of the major activities (i.e., inspections/audits, analysis, testing, and on-orbit) are
necessary as each is responsible for revealing some of the failures caused by each fault type.
A 3-dimensional plot of the frequency counts for the 5 x 5 contingency table for activities
and fault types is shown in Figure 7.1. By examining the contingency table with respect
to the effectiveness of different activities it can be seen that analysis and testing activities
revealed the majority of faults for each fault type. In general a smaller percentage of total
failures are detected by testing than by analysis (i.e., 38% of failures were detected by testing
compared to 49% detected by analysis). However, when focusing on the failures caused by
coding faults we see that testing activities were more effective than analysis in revealing
coding faults (i.e., 50% of coding faults were detected during testing while only 39% were
detected through analysis). With respect to requirement faults, the analysis verification
activity revealed more faults than testing (i.e., 58% of requirement faults were detected
through analysis while only 30% were detected during testing). It should be noted that the
Inspection/Audit activities, which revealed close to 7% of the total number of failures, seem
to be more likely to reveal requirement faults than any other type of faults (i.e., 47% of the
total number of failures revealed by Inspection/Audit activities were caused by requirement
faults). Additionally, it can be seen that the majority of on-orbit failures were caused by
coding faults (i.e., 53% of on-orbit failures were cause by coding faults).
Since on-orbit failures are one of the high priority failure classes in terms of prevention
and detection, we explored the characteristics of on-orbit failures compared to all other
failures by focusing on another meaningful grouping of verification activity categories which
differentiates only between failures reported on–orbit (i.e., post–release) and failures reported
during any development and testing activities (i.e., pre-release). Hence, we defined a binary
random variable ‘on-orbit detection’ which was set to one if the failure occurred on-orbit
and to zero otherwise. Of course, this explores a different question:
What types of faults commonly led to on–orbit failures?
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Figure 7.1: Frequency counts across verification activities and fault types
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In other words, we are interested to discover which fault types are most likely to escape the
pre–release detection, which obviously has a practical value.
Figure 7.2 presents the distribution of fault types for failures reported during development
and testing and the distribution of fault types for failures reported on–orbit. (Note that a
logarithmic scale is used to allow the trends in the small number of on–orbit failures to be
seen.) The same information is given in tabular form in Table 7.1. Based on Figure 7.2 and
Table 7.1 we make the following main observations:
• Coding faults and requirement faults were major causes of failures observed
during development and testing, as well as on-orbit. As it can be seen from
Table 7.1 the relative contribution of the coding faults to the total number of failures
increased from approximately 35% during development and testing to almost 53% on-
orbit. On the other hand, the contributions of the requirements faults and data problems
to the total number of failures decreased from 35% and 15% to approximately 14% and
6%, respectively. Coding faults, requirements faults, and data problems (the three most
common fault types overall) together are ’sources’ for around 86% of the total number
of failures during development and testing, and about 73% of on-orbit failures.
• The relative contribution of failures due to design faults and integration
faults was larger on–orbit than during the development and testing. In
particular, the relative percentage of failures caused by design faults increased from
around 6% of failures reported during development and testing to around 13% for
on-orbit failures, while the relative percentage of failures caused by integration faults
increased from around 2% of failures reported during development and testing to 11%
for on-orbit failures. The fact that the relative contribution of failures caused by inte-
gration faults actually increases on-orbit suggests that components may be interacting
in unexpected ways and that more integration testing before components are released
to fly on on-orbit may be beneficial.
Coding faults and requirement faults, which were the two main fault types responsible for
all failures, are also the main contributors to post–release (i.e., on–orbit) failures. Similar
results were found in [43], that is, the most common types of faults identified from the overall
modification requests were the same as those identified from the post–release modification
requests. However, when only on–orbit failures are considered, coding faults contribute
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Figure 7.2: Distribution of major fault types pre- and post-release
Fault Type % of Development % of On-
& Testing SCRs orbit SCRs
Requirements fault 35.42 14.12
Coding fault 35.42 52.94
Data problem 15.20 5.88
Design fault 5.90 12.94
Process and Procedure 3.19 0.00
Integration fault 2.10 10.59
Other 1.66 3.53
Not Identified 1.09 0.00
Table 7.1: Major fault types pre- and post-release
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significantly more than requirements faults, followed closely by design faults and integration
faults. It is clear that although common fault types during development and testing tend to
be common on–orbit as well, their relative contributions can change. Therefore, we explore
whether the likelihood that a failure occurs on–orbit depends on the type of faults that
caused the failure. We formulate and test the following null hypothesis:
H20: The distribution of fault types is the same for failures reported
pre-release and failures reported post–release (i.e., on-orbit).
We calculated χ2 = 7.9, C = 0.08, Cmax = 0.79, and C
∗ = 0.10. Since the probability of
obtaining χ2 = 7.9 is less than 0.001 which is less than α = 0.05, the null hypothesis H20
can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the fault types are not distributed
the same way across failures reported pre- and post–release. Furthermore, although the
correlation between on-orbit detection status and fault types is statistically significant, the
degree of association is less than that of verification activity and fault type (i.e, C∗ = 0.10
compared to C∗ = 0.28).
Referring back to Figure 7.1 and focusing on the on–orbit verification activity we make an
interesting observation: coding faults and design faults are the most likely types of faults to
escape pre-release detection, that is, a larger percent of each of these fault types were revealed
on-orbit when compared to the percentage of failures caused by other fault types that were
revealed on-orbit. Considering the fact that coding faults are significantly more commonly
responsible for on-orbit failures than design faults (see Table 7.1) suggests that focusing on
the prevention and elimination of coding faults would be most beneficial in decreasing the
number of on-orbit failures.
7.3 Fault Type and Severity
Identifying which types of faults are likely to lead to safety–critical failures can be useful
when prioritizing fixes. Surely, faults that are likely to lead to safety–critical failures should
be addressed immediately. Hence, we explored the following research question:
RQ2–B: Are certain types of faults more likely to result in safety–critical failures?
The breakdown of the severity level across the major fault types, which is shown in
Figure 7.3, indicates that:
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Figure 7.3: Severity levels per major fault type
• All major fault types can cause safety–critical failures. 11% of the failures
caused by coding faults were classified as safety–critical. Note that 11% is rather
significant percentage considering that coding faults were responsible for 36% of the
total number of failures. Although 23% of the failures caused by integration faults were
classified as safety–critical their contribution to safety–critical failures was significantly
smaller since only 2% of the total number of failures were caused by integration faults
(as shown in Figure 6.1). Similarly, 18% of the failures caused by design faults were
classified as safety–critical, but only 6% of the total number of failures were caused by
design faults (as shown in Figure 6.1).
Based on this initial descriptive analysis, we formulated and tested the following hypoth-
esis:
H30: The distribution of the severity of failures is the same across
all fault types.
Here, we used safety–critical, non–critical, and unclassified categories for severity and the
same categories for fault types as in H10 (i.e., requirement faults, design faults, coding faults,
interface & integration faults, and other). In this case, χ2 = 67.87, C = 0.22, Cmax = 0.85
and C∗ = 0.26, which means we should reject H30 and the correlation between severity and
fault types is statistically significant.
The frequency counts of the main fault types in each severity level are shown in the
3-dimensional plot in Figure 7.4. It can be seen that for each fault type (excluding other)
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Figure 7.4: Frequency counts across fault types and severity levels
the most common severity class is non–critical, followed by unclassified and then safety–
critical. However, when focusing on safety–critical failures only, it can be seen that 45%
of the total number of safety–critical failures were caused by coding faults ; about 24% of
the total number of safety–critical failures were caused by requirement faults ; Interface &
integration faults were responsible for 15% of the total number of safety–critical failures;
and design faults and were responsible for causing 12% of the total number of safety–critical
failures.
When integrating these results with the results of research questions RQ1–A and RQ2–A,
it appears that coding faults were not only responsible for a significant percentage of the total
number of failures (i.e., 36%, see Figure 6.1) and more than 50% of the total number of on-
orbit failures (see Table 7.1), they were responsible for almost 50% of the total safety–critical
failures (see Figure 7.4) and 52% of the safety–critical on–orbit failures.
Although it is commonly believed that the most beneficial way to improve software quality
is to focus on so called early-life cycle faults (i.e., faults introduced during requirement and
design phases), our results suggest that it is also very important to focus on preventing the
introduction and improving the detection and removal of coding faults as they are heavily
associated with high priority failures (i.e., safety–critical failures and on-orbit failures).
At first sight it appears that our observations related to coding faults contradict the
observation made in [45] based on analysis of nearly 200 safety–critical post-launch anomalies
from seven unmanned spacecraft. More detailed analysis of the results presented in [45]
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reveals that the percentage of anomalies caused by coding faults in [45] is comparable to the
percentage of anomalies related to requirements and design faults together. As we pointed
out in [37], the lower total percentage of requirements, design, and coding faults (32.7%)
in [45] is due to the fact that the study analyzed anomalies, with a large percentage of
procedure and process faults (29.2%) and large percentage of anomalies for which nothing
was fixed (13.6%).
7.4 Verification Activity and Severity
Considering both the verification activity and severity together, we explored the following
research question:
RQ2–C: Which verification activities reveal safety–critical failures?
For this purpose we tested the following null hypothesis:
H40: The distribution of safety–critical and non-critical failures is
the same across activities.
To test this hypothesis we used the same categories for verification activity as in case
of hypothesis H10: analysis, inspection/audit, testing, on–orbit and otherand as mentioned
earlier, for severity we use: safety–critical, non–critical, and unclassified. Based on the 5 x 3
contingency table, we calculated χ2 = 69.44, C = 0.23, Cmax = 0.85, and C
∗ = 0.27. Since
the probability of obtaining χ2 = 69.44 is less 0.001 which is less than α, we reject the null
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that safety–critical failures are more likely
to be revealed by certain activities. Further, we conclude that although C∗ = 0.27 repre-
sents fairly weak correlation, the value is statistically significant; the degree of correlation
between verification activity and severity is comparable to the degree of correlation between
verification activity and fault type.
Similarly as in the case of types of faults, safety–critical failures were related more often
with some activities than with others. Figure 7.5 shows a 3-dimensional plot of the frequency
counts for verification activity and severity features. Notice that for both non-critical failures
and unclassified failures analysis was the most successful verification activity in detecting
failures (i.e, 51% of non-critical failures and 51% of unclassified failures were discovered by
analysis). However, it can be seen that slightly more safety–critical failures were discovered
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Figure 7.5: Frequency counts across verification activities and severity levels
Severity % of Development % of On-




Table 7.2: Severity levels pre- and post-release
by testing than by analysis. Specifically, 40% of the total number of safety–critical failures
were discovered through some testing verification activity, while 35% were discovered during
analysis. Inspection/Audit activities revealed approximately 7% of failures in each severity
class. Focusing on the safety–critical failures, it can be seen that a fairly significant portion
(i.e., 13%) of the total number of safety–critical failures occurred on-orbit.
Hence, we also explored the relationship between severity and on–orbit detection sta-
tus. Table 7.2 shows the percentage of safety–critical, non-critical and unclassified failures
reported during development and testing, and on–orbit. We formally tested the following
hypothesis:
H50: The distribution of the severity is the same for pre–release and
post–release failures.
By calculating χ2 = 51.49, C = 0.20, Cmax = 0.76, and C
∗ = 0.26 we reject H50
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the distribution of the severity of pre-release
failures differs from the distribution of the severity of post–release failures. Once again,
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although the correlation is weak, it is statistically significant. Unlike the fault type, severity
is comparably correlated for both the on-orbit detection status and the more fine-grained
verification activity feature.
Based on Table 7.2 and the statistical results we made the following observations:
• A larger percentage of on-orbit failures were safety–critical. As shown in
Table 7.2, 34% of the total number of on–orbit failures are safety–critical, while less
than 8% of the total number of failures reported during development and testing are
safety–critical.
• Greater emphasis was placed on fixing and documenting on-orbit failures.
This is shown by the fact that only 13% of on-orbit failures were unclassified compared
to 28% unclassified failures during development and testing.
Further study of the differences between the safety–critical failures detected during de-
velopment and testing and the safety–critical failures that occurred on-orbit may provide
insights on how to pro-actively decrease the number of safety–critical on-orbit failures.
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Chapter 8
Analysis of trends across releases
In this chapter we present the analysis of trends in features within and across releases
for types of faults, activities (i.e., pre-release and post–release), and severity (i.e., critical
and non-critical). For this analysis we selected a subset of components with two or more
releases that had at least 70 failures reported against them (i.e., at least 70 non–conformance
SCRs were filed against the component). We believe that less failures, when broken down
per release, would not show realistic trends, or at least the results would be very sensitive to
small variations. Thus, the analysis presented in this chapter was based on the data from the
following eleven components: components 7 and 8 (each with two releases), components 13,
14, 15, 16 (each with three releases), component 17 (with four releases), component 18 (with
five releases), componenta 19, 20, 21 (each with seven releases). This subset contains almost
70% of the total non-conformance SCRs explored in Chapters 6 and 7 and , that is, 2, 029
SCRs were reported against the selected eleven components. As expected this subset shows
strong support for the observations made in chapter 6 based on the entire data set. It should
be noted that only four components have more than four releases (i.e., R5 to R7) and in
some cases the number of failures reported in later releases was very small (e.g., component
20 has only two recorded failures in release seven) which limits the analysis for later releases.
We consider trends in features across releases, first collectively for all eleven components
and then individually for each component. Additionally, the per release data allowed us to
explore relationships between the number of failures across releases (i.e., from one release to
the next) and within individual releases (i.e., from pre- to post–release).
This chapter address the third set of research questions:
RQ3: Do trends differ within releases or from one release to the next?
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A. What is the distribution of the number of failures across releases? Further, is
there a relationship between the number failures reported across releases, that is,
between release n and release n + 1?
B. Does the contribution of dominating fault types change as the software matures
across releases? Specifically, do dominating faults types change from one release
to the next?
C. Are certain releases more likely to exhibit on–orbit failures? Further, is there
a relationship between the number of failures reported during development and
testing and the number of failures reported on–orbit?
D. Does the severity level of failures change as the software matures both within and
across releases? Specifically, are safety–critical failures more likely to occur in
earlier or later releases?
Based on the fact that some of the features explored to answer the third set of research
questions were on the ratio scale we were able to use a stronger measures for correlation. To
determine the appropriate measure of correlation, we test for normality using the Shapiro–
Wilks W test which is commonly used on samples sizes less than fifty [21]. Pearson coefficient
of correlation is the best in terms of power, but it cannot be used if the random variables fail
the test for normality. In such case one can use the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient,
which does not assume normality. Suppose we have two random variables X and Y whose
values are sorted and ranked with corresponding rankings denoted by X1, X2, . . . , XN and
Y1, Y2, . . . , YN . Correlation between the two variables would be perfect if and only if Xi = Yi
for all i’s, which makes it logical to use the differences Di = Xi − Yi as an indication of











Unlike the contingency coefficient C used in the previous chapter, Spearman’s rank cor-
relation coefficient is a number between −1 and 1 (−1 ≤ rs ≤ 1), with -1 and 1 representing
perfect negative and positive correlation, respectively. In order to test for the significance of
the correlation coefficient the sample must be randomly drawn from the population. In this
chapter the population consists of eleven components, thus we randomly sampled six com-
ponents five different times and conducted the statistical test on each sample. The test of
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significance of rs is based on possible permutation of ranks and the probability of obtaining
the calculated value of rs. In other words, the result is significant if the calculated value of
rs is larger than the critical value of Spearman’s rank correlation. For sample size N = 6
and significance level α = 0.05, the critical value is rs = 0.83.
8.1 The distribution of failures across releases
First, we explored the number of failures recorded per release for each of the selected
eleven components in order to answer the following research question:
RQ3–A: What is the distribution of the number of failures across releases? Fur-
ther, is there a relationship between the number failures reported across releases,
that is, between release n and release n + 1?
Figures 8.1 through 8.4 present the distribution of failures across releases, where com-
ponents are grouped by the number of consecutive releases in the data. The distribution of
SCRs across releases follows a bell shaped curve for the majority of the components (i.e.,
components 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21), which implies that despite the iterative development
process and added functionality between releases, components tend to exhibit fewer failures
in later releases and software reliability growth has occurred. The few exceptions are ex-
plainable. Component 13 shows a monotonically increasing trend, which we believe believe
will follow a bell shaped curve as it matures through releases. Additionally, as shown in
Figure 8.1, for components 7 and 8 (which only have two releases and are the youngest com-
ponents studies) the number of failures decreases from release one to release two, similarly
as component 16 (see Figure 8.2). We suspect this behavior may be explained by the func-
tionality added between releases. In other words, release 2 may not have included significant
additional functionality, the components may have been updated only to fix faults in release
1.
Next, we explored whether the number of failures in release n provided any indication
of the number of failures that occurred in the next release n + 1. Based on the fact the
every non-conformance SCR was assigned to one of the 21 components, but many could
not be mapped to files we explored the relationship in the number of failure per release per
component.
For this purpose we formulated the following null hypothesis:
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Figure 8.1: Distribution of failures across
components with 2 releases
Figure 8.2: Distribution of failures across
components with 3 releases
Figure 8.3: Distribution of
failures across components
with 4 or 5 releases
Figure 8.4: Distribution of failures across components
with 7 releases
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H60: At component level, the number of failures in release n + 1 is
unrelated to the number of failures that occurred in release n.
Since later releases are based on fewer components and have significantly less failures
reported, we only test H60 for releases R1 and R2, and then for R2 and R3. We use the
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality, which is recommended for small to medium sized samples
[21]. According to the test, the hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected for R1 and R2,
but it is clearly rejected for R3. Hence for consistency, we do not use the Pearson correlation
coefficient. Instead, we use the Spearman rank correlation coefficient rs, which does not
require normality.
Figure 8.5 shows a scatter plot representing the relationship between the number of
failures in release R1 and number of failures in release R2 for all eleven components, with
each dot representing a component. The calculated correlation rs = 0.42, which is less than
the critical value of 0.52 for N = 11 and α = 0.05, leads us to conclude that H6 cannot
be rejected. To test for the statistical significance of the calculate correlation, we sampled
five random samples, each with six components. For each of the five random samples,
0.14 ≤ rs ≤ 0.71 which is always less than the critical value of 0.83 for N = 6 and α = 0.05.
Therefore, once again we found we can not reject the null hypothesis H60. This result
basically means that at the component level the number of failures recorded in the second
release was unrelated to the number of failures in the first release.
Figure 8.6 shows the scatter plot between the number of failures reported in release
R2 and the number of failures reported in release R3 for the nine components that had
at least three releases. The calculated value of rs = 0.22 for all nine components, and
−0.60 ≤ rs ≤ 0.20 for five random samples of six components did not allow us to reject
the null hypothesis, and thus we conclude that at component level the number of failures in
release three was unrelated to the number of failures in release two; that is, any relationship
suggested by the graph most likely is due to chance. Further, even when considering the
relationship between the number of failures in release three, based on the cumulative number
of failures in the two previous releases (one and two) the computed value of rs is not large
enough to reject the null hypothesis for all nine components or any of the five random
samples, each with six randomly selected components.
The lack of a statistically significant correlation between the number of failures identified
in subsequent releases at the component level may be explained by the iterative development
process followed by the mission. Components tend to have unique schedules with respect
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Figure 8.5: The number of failures in release
R1 versus the number of failures in release
R2 (rs = 0.42)
Figure 8.6: The number of failures in release
R2 versus the number of failures in release
R3 (rs = 0.22)
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to added functionality across releases leading to no clear association between the number
failures. Further exploration in this direction was not possible due to a lack of detailed data
about how and when functionality was added or removed in each release.
These results differ with respect to observations Biyani and Santahanam made in [11],
which stated “it is clear that historical defect1 information is valuable in terms of arriving
at any prediction algorithms” and found that to predict defect volume by module for a new
release it is sufficient to consider defect history from only the immediately previous release.
Additionally, evidence that faulty files in early releases tend to remain faulty in later release
was shown in [54] and [58]. Specifically, in [54] the authors identified the ‘high fault’ files
(i.e., the top 20% of files when ordered by decreasing number of faults) for each of the 13
releases and found that between 22% and 63% of files identified as high fault files in release
n were also identified as high fault files in release n + 1. In [58] the conclusion of fault
persistence across releases was based on the fact that files with a higher than average fault
density in the first release tend to have higher than average fault densities in later releases.
The conflicting results may be due to the fact that different levels of granularity were
used. Specifically, we used the component level, file level was used in [54], and module level
was used in [1], [26], [11]). However, we suspect that due of the small number of failures
associated with the individual releases of each component similar analysis at the file level
would lead to even fewer failures per file and thus would also fail to show a relationship.
However, based on the available data we were not able to link the non–conformance SCRs to
the files and therefore we could not explore whether the trends observed at the component
level would hold true at the file level.
It should be noted that although no relationship was found at the component level, future
work focused on exploring similar trends on different system would help in building empirical
knowledge and clarifying this research question.
In the following sections we explore the trends related to the distributions of fault types,
on–orbit failures, and severity of failures across multiple releases.
1Based on the statements given in [11] it appears that in that paper ’defects’ refer to both faults and
failures.
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Figure 8.7: Major fault types per release
8.2 Common Fault Types within and across Releases
In this section we present the analysis of the fault types across and within releases.
Specifically, we considered the three most common fault types (i.e., requirements faults,
coding faults, and data problems) and combined the others in to the others category to
answer the following research question:
RQ3–B: Does the contribution of dominating fault types change as the software
matures across releases? Specifically, do dominating faults types change from
one release to the next?
The distribution of the fault types across releases for all failures associated with the
eleven components considered in this chapter is shown in Figure 8.7. Based on the figure
it is obvious that the three major fault types persisted across releases. Requirements faults,
coding faults, and data problems together contributed to 82%–86% of failures across all
releases.
We further explored fault types using the box plots shown in Figures 8.8 through 8.10.
We choose to use box plots because they show both the central tendency and dispersion of
random variables, which is important in this context having in mind the variability of fault
types across releases at component level. In each graph, for each release, the box contains
the 25th to 75th percentile, and the horizontal line within the box represents the median.
The whiskers (i.e., the vertical lines that reach outside the box) represent the range. The
maximum values, show a bell shaped curve similar to the ones shown in Figures 8.1 through
8.4 in chapter 8.1. In the majority of cases in Figures 8.8 - 8.10, the maximum value shown by
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Figure 8.8: Box plot showing the number of
SCRs due to requirement faults per release
Figure 8.9: Box plot showing the number of
SCRs due to coding faults per release
Figure 8.10: Box plot showing the number of
SCRs due to data problem faults per release
the whiskers belongs to component 20, especially in releases R3 and later. We also observed
that for each fault type the number of failures varied most in releases R3 and/or R4, which
is likely due to the the large number of SCRs reported by component 20 in R3 and R4 (see
Figure 8.4). Notice that the 25th to 75th percentile boxes for each release of the common
types varied considerably less. Another perhaps more interesting observation is the fact
that the median for each fault type is stable across all releases, which means that although
some components tend to experience larger variations in the distribution of fault types across
releases, there is a clear central tendency.
For releases R1 through R5 we formally verified the stability in the medians for each com-
mon fault type using the Kruskal-Wallis test, which tests the null hypothesis that different
samples (i.e., in our case each release) were drawn from distributions with the same median.
Kruskal-Wallis test is based on ranks of the combined sample values of the k samples. The
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Coding Faults Requirement Faults Data Problems
H 1.23 4.71 1.30
p-value 0.87 0.32 0.86
Table 8.1: Kruskal-Wallis H statistics and corresponding P-value for major fault types










− 3(n+ 1) (8.2)
where k is the number of samples, ni is the number of observations in i-th sample, n =
∑
ni
is the total number of observations in all samples combined, and Ti is the sum of ranks in
ith sample.
It can be shown that H is distributed approximately as chi–square distribution with k−1
degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis may be rejected if the probability of χ2 = H is less
than α = 0.05. Note that samples can have a different number of observations ni. In our
case, for each attribute we consider n1 = 11 components for R1, n2 = 11 components for
R2, n3 = 9 components for R3, n4 = 5 components for R4, and n5 = 4 components for R5.
Therefore, n = 40 for the 5 groups (i.e., the five releases). Table 8.1 shows the calculated
H values and the probability of occurrence of equal or greater value of H under the null
hypothesis for each of the three common types of faults. Since for each fault type (i.e.,
requirements faults, coding faults, and data problems) the p− value is larger then α = 0.05
we cannot reject the null hypotheses that releases are drawn from the distributions with the
same median number of failures due to corresponding fault type. Thus, we conclude that
for each the major faults types the medians were drawn from similar distributions in each
release.
8.3 On-orbit failures per release
The study of post–release failures (i.e., on-orbit failures in our case) is of utmost impor-
tance for every system, and especially for safety-critical systems. Hence, we explored the
following research question:
RQ3–C: Are certain releases more likely to exhibit on–orbit failures? Further, is
there a relationship between the number of failures reported during development
and testing and the number of failures reported on–orbit?
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The distribution of pre-release (i.e., development and testing) failures and post–release
(i.e., on-orbit) failures across releases for all eleven components cumulatively is shown in
Figure 8.11. Additionally, we explored the number of post-release failures reported per
release for each component individually. Based on Figure 8.11 and the per release per
component analysis we made the
• On-orbit failures accounted for a very small percentage of total failures per
release. As shown in Figure 8.11, across different releases between 0 - 8%2 of failures
per release occurred on-orbit.
• The software is improving and stabilizing in the field. The percentage of on-
orbit failures consistently decreased after release R2 for all but one component (i.e.
component 18). It should be noted that due to the ongoing iterative development on-
orbit failures against later releases have occurred after the date our data sample was
taken. Nevertheless, the occurrence of on-orbit failures decreases as components and
the project mature through releases.
The facts that (1) on–orbit failures accounted for a very small portion of failures per each
release and cumulatively for all releases, and (2) the percentage of on-orbit failures decreased
as the software matured through releases suggests that the verification and validation proce-
dures in place have been very successful at removing faults. Other studies report on similar
values. For example, 4% of faults were detected post–release for each of the two releases
studied in [26], while for each of thirteen releases studied in [54] between 0% and 9% of the
faults were reported post–release.
Since on-orbit failures tend to be more expensive to fix and are more likely to be associated
with a higher severity it would be helpful to know which components are more likely to
experience on-orbit failures. Intuitively, it could be argued that components that exhibit
more failures during development and testing (i.e., pre-release) are well-tested and therefore
unlikely to fail in the field. On the other hand, it could also be argued that some components
may be failure prone due to fundamental reasons and therefore will continue to fail post–
release. Further, since results from the related work were inconsistent with respect to the
conflicting theories (pertaining to which modules are likely to be failure prone post–release)
we explored the relationship between the number of pre-release failures (i.e., failures identified
2Note that the percentage of on-orbit failures is for the eleven components considered in this chapter and
therefore differs from the percentage reported in chapter 6 for all 21 components.
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Figure 8.11: On-orbit failures per release
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Figure 8.12: Scatter plot showing the rela-
tionship pre- and post-release failures, cu-
mulatively over all releases, (rs = 0.80)
during development and testing) and the number of post–release (i.e., on-orbit) failures first
cumulatively for all releases and then within individual releases.
The scattered plot of the pre–release failures versus post–release failures, cumulatively
over all releases for the eleven components considered in this chapter, which is shown in
Figure 8.12, indicates a positive correlation. Therefore, we formulated and formally tested
the following null hypothesis:
H70: The number of post–release (i.e., on–orbit) failures is unre-
lated to the number of failures that occurred pre–release (i.e., during
development and testing), cumulatively for all releases, at component
level.
Since the distributions of the number of pre-release and post–release failures fail the
Shapiro–Wilke W test for normality, we again used the Spearman rank correlation coefficient
given with equation (8.1) to test the null hypothesis H70. When considering the relationship
between the cumulative number of SCRs entered against each component during development
and testing with the cumulative number of SCRs entered on orbit the computed value of the
Spearman rank correlation coefficient rs = 0.80 indicates very strong correlation. To test
the significance of the correlation, we randomly select six out of the eleven components five
times and calculate rs using the equation (8.1) for N = 6. The computed values for these
five random samples are 0.93 < rs < 0.99, which are statistically significant at α = 0.05 level
since the critical value for N = 6 is rs = 0.83. Based on the observation in the data from all
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Figure 8.13: Scatter plot showing the rela-
tionship pre- and post-release failures for re-
lease R1, (rs = 0.53).
Figure 8.14: Scatter plot showing the rela-
tionship pre- and post-release failures for re-
lease R2, (rs = 0.51).
eleven components and the significance of the association in the random samples, we reject
the null hypothesis H70 in favor of the alternative hypothesis that
H7A: At the component level, cumulatively over all releases, the
number of post–release failures is positively correlated with the num-
ber of pre-release failures.
From a software engineering perspective this means that cumulatively over all releases, com-
ponents which had more non-conformance SCRs during development and testing also tend
to have more on-orbit failures.
Further, we explored the relationship between pre-release and post–release failures within
individual releases. The analysis was restricted to releases one to four (R1 – R4), since no
on-orbit failures were reported in our data set for releases five through seven (R5 – R7).
The corresponding scatter plots are shown in Figures 8.13 through 8.16, where each dot
represents a component. Note that for R1, component 8 and component 21 were excluded
as release R1 was never loaded on orbit for either of these components. The values of the
Spearman correlation coefficient rs which were computed using the equation (8.1) are given
in Table 8.2 with the corresponding sample sizes N , that is, the number of components that
have valid pre- and post–release data for the release.
These results showed moderate to strong positive correlation, which means that at the
component level within individual releases a high incidence of pre-release failures implied a
high incidence of post–release failures. In other words, for releases one through four, the
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Figure 8.15: Scatter plot showing the rela-
tionship pre- and post-release failures for re-
lease R3, (rs = 0.47).
Figure 8.16: Scatter plot showing the rela-
tionship pre- and post-release failures for re-
lease R4, (rs = 0.96).
Release R1 R2 R3 R4
N 9 11 9 6
rs 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.96
Table 8.2: Spearman correlation coefficient between pre-release and post–release failures, at
component level, for releases one to four
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components of the NASA mission that had a high number of non-conformance SCRs during
development and testing tended to experience more on-orbit failures.
The relationship between pre–release and post–release faults has been explored before
(e.g. [1], [11], [26], [54]). However, the results were conflicting. Thus, Fenton in [26] and
Ostrand and Weyuker in [54] found that modules that were fault prone pre-release were
among the least fault prone modules post–release. On the other hand, studies conducted
by Biyani and Santhanam in [11] and Anderrson and Runeson in [1] (which is a replication
of [26]) led to the opposite result: modules that were fault prone pre-release were also fault
prone post–release. Further the Pearson correlation coefficient value used to measure the
extent of correlation in [1] also showed moderate correlation, that is, 0.56 ≤ r ≤ 0.72 for
each of the three projects. Our results for the cumulative number of failures over all releases,
as well for the individual releases one through four, support the observations made in [11]
and [1], but due to a small number of on–orbit failures (i.e., less than 8 in any release of
any component) we refrain from drawing strong conclusions. Future work with respect to
the relationship between pre- and post- release failures should consider mutliple levels of
abstraction to help answer this research question.
8.4 Exploring safety–critical failures within and across
releases
Finally, we quantify the severity of failures across releases, first cumulatively for all eleven
components considered in this chapter, and then for each individual component to answer
the following research question:
RQ3–D: Does the severity level of failures change as the software matures both
within and across releases? Specifically, are safety–critical failures more likely to
occur in earlier or later releases?
The per release data showed that almost every release of each component had been asso-
ciated with both critical and non-critical failures. However, we did observe some interesting
trends:
• A very small percentage of failures within each release are safety–critical.
As shown in Figure 8.17, depending on the release, from 0% – 12% of failures reported
against each release were safety–critical.
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Figure 8.17: Severity levels per release
• The percentage of safety–critical failures tends to decrease as components
mature. The majority of components showed a consistent decrease in the number of
critical failures per release. A few components, which showed an increase of safety-
critical failures in the initial releases, eventually showed a decrease in later releases.
We suspect this may be a result of the functionality added.
The phenomenon of the increasing number of safety–critical failures for the initial releases
of some components may be due to problems with integration of components as some unex-




Up to this point the research questions were focused on characterizing failures and the
faults that caused them. In this chapter we present the results of our analysis of the changes
made to address the non-conformance SCRs. As stated earlier, when changes are made to
address an SCR, Change Notices (CNs) is created to track the changes per component. It
should be noted that almost all cases, changes were made to correct the fault(s) that caused
the failure (observed or potential), but in some much more rare cases changes were made to
implement a workaround that prevents the reactivation of faults, which may or may not be
fixed at a later date.
As stated earlier, one of the main goals of the analysis of fixes was to consider all changes
to fix all faults associated with an individual failure, as our earlier work [37] clearly showed
failures can often be associated with multiple faults. The existing relationship between SCRs
and CNs made this possible (i.e., an SCR can have zero, one, or multiple CNs associated
with it). Considering both types of change documents, that is, SCRs and CNs, allowed
us complete the link from the fault(s) that caused individual failures to changes made to
prevent the failures from (re)occurring, which to the best of our knowledge has never before
been done. Specifically, we explored the fourth set of research questions:
RQ4: What are the common characteristics of fixes? And, how do features of fault and
failures relate to features of fixes?
A. Which components are affected most often by fixes? Further, are any groups of
components commonly fixed together?
B. Which types of software artifacts were fixed most often?
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C. Is there any relation between the type of fault that causes a failure and the types
of artifacts that need to be fixed?
D. Is there any relation between the verification activity that revealed the fault(s)
and the types of artifacts fixed?
E. In terms of the artifacts fixed, do safety–critical failures differ from non-critical
failures?
F. Is the effort spent implementing fixes uniform per SCR? per component? If not,
what are the common characteristics of fixes that required the most effort?
The original data set analyzed with respect to fault and failure features consisted of
2,558 SCRs, 2,051 of which had at least one associated CN. However, some of the SCRs
were still ‘open’ at the time of the data dump, that is, they had not been fully addressed
and/or verified. To avoid any bias that might be introduced by considering SCRs that may
require additional changes we focused the fix analysis to SCRs and CNs that had officially
been closed, that is, the fixes had been implemented and verified. Thus, the analysis in this
section is based 1, 257 closed SCRs and the 2, 620 associated CNs1.
The number of closed SCRs and associated CNs are given in Table 9.1 for each of the
21 components. Table 9.1 only contains 2,496 CNs because 124 of the CNs associated with
closed SCRs were associated with simulation components or other components which were
outside the scope of the 21 components analyzed. The most interesting trend is that almost
every component was fixed more times than it suspectedly failed. This is clearly a direct
result of the fact that we consider multiple CNs per individual SCR, however, it serves to
shows how much information may be missing for studies that assumed each failure was traced
to a single localized fault. Additionally, the evidence that failures were caused by multiple
faults generalizes our earlier results in [37], which showed a similar trend on a small subset
of the failures considered here, that is, failures cause by coding faults that could be mapped
to changed in source code files.
Based on the data available in the CNs we explored types of artifacts fixed, the compo-
nents fixed and the effort required to implement the fixes to answer the fourth set of research
questions (i.e., RQ4). First we explored features of fixes individually and then with respect
to how they relate to fault and failures features explored earlier.
1It should be noted that the observations made throughout the previous chapters remain consistent on
this subset on closed SCRs.
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# of closed # of























Table 9.1: Number closed SCRs and associated CNs per components
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9.1 Components Fixed
We began by exploring the components affected by changes made to correct faults and
prevent the failures reported through SCRs from re-occurring. Hence, we explored the
following research question:
RQ4–A: Which components are affected most often by fixes? Further, are any
groups of components commonly fixed together?
As stated earlier, the fact that each SCR can be linked to more than one CNs allowed us
explore multiple fixes per failure (i.e., non-conformance SCR). For the 1,257 closed SCRs:
• 82% led to changes only in the same component the SCR was written against.
• 15% led to changes in the same component the SCR was written against, as well as at
least one other component.
• 3% led to changes in others component(s) then the component the SCR was written
against.
As expected, the majority of SCRs led to changes (i.e., CNs) only within the component
the non-conformance SCR was filed against; however, 15% of SCRs resulted in changes to a
different component. According to the project personnel, the spread of fixes can be attributed
to several factors, such as, the interdependence of components and the fact that in some cases
there is more than one way to implement a fix. The cases where the failed component was
not fixed at all may be explained by the fact that sometimes a component simply served as a
catalyst for a failure to surface even when all associated fault(s) were contained outside that
component, especially if data is shared between components. In addition, for some cases for
the quickest and easiest way to fix a problem was through a different component. It should
be noted that the small percent of SCRs that did not result in any change to the ‘failed’
component (i.e., 3%) indicates that the SCR the non-conformance was reported against was
indeed contributing to the non-conformance and thus supports the quality of the data in
terms of representing the fault, failure and fix relationships.
Table 9.2 presents the mean number of CNs associated with each SCR broken down per
component2. It also provides the standard deviation and coefficient of variation3. It can
2Statistical moments are not given for component 9 because as shown in Table 9.1 only one closed SCRs
associated with component 9 had fix data.
3The coefficient of variation is defined as a ratio of the standard deviation and the mean and thus can be
used to compare the variation for different components, even if the means are drastically different from one
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Figure 9.1: Box plot showing the number of fixes linked to individual failures per component
be seen that the means range from 1.00 to 2.77 CNs per SCR for the 21 components, and
the largest means tend to have the higher coefficients of variation. For some components,
individuals SCRs required a much larger number of the CNs, which can be seen in the box
plot shown in Figure 9.1. For each component, the box shown in the graph contains the
25th to 75th percentile of the numbers of CNs filed per SCR, and the median number of CNs
represented by the horizontal line within the box. The whiskers (i.e., the vertical lines that
reach outside the box) represent the range and show the outliers. The box plot shows both
the central tendency and dispersion in the number of CNs filed per SCR for each component.
The fact that components have similar medians (typically around 1 to 2 CNs per component)
shows there is a clear central tendency. In addition, since all boxes are relatively small, but
several have whiskers that are much longer (see components 13, 16, and 20) we conclude
that there is fairly small dispersion in terms of 75th − 25th percentile, but are reminded that
some SCRs associated with several components are outliers that resulted in considerably
more CNs (e.g., up to 41 CNs created to address one SCR filed against the component 20).
9.1.1 Failed-fixed Component Relationship
Considering that some non-conformance SCRs were associated with multiple components
we decided to explore the relationship between the component the non-conformance was
reported against (i.e., the failed component) and the components that were fixed. Thus,
another
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Mean # of Standard Coefficient
component CNs per SCR deviation of variation
1 1.63 1.39 0.86
2 1.50 0.76 0.50
3 1.00 0.00 0.00
4 1.50 0.58 0.38
5 2.00 1.41 0.71
6 1.27 0.80 0.63
7 1.24 0.56 0.45
8 1.64 0.92 0.56
9 NA NA NA
10 1.63 1.19 0.73
11 1.42 0.58 0.41
12 1.55 0.69 0.44
13 2.49 3.35 1.35
14 1.96 1.55 0.79
15 2.35 1.80 0.77
16 2.20 3.05 1.39
17 1.46 0.90 0.62
18 1.83 1.59 0.87
19 2.15 2.33 1.08
20 2.77 3.32 1.20
21 1.53 1.34 0.87
Table 9.2: Mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation for number of fixes linked
to individual failures per component
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we defined the failed component - fixed component relationship. It should be noted, as
mentioned earlier, close to 97% of the non-conformance SCRs led to at least some changes
within the same component the SCR was written against, which suggests that the component
the non-conformance was written against contained at least one fault associated with that
non-conformance.
Figure 9.2 shows a 3-dimensional plot representing for each failed component the number
of times each of the other 21 components were fixed (i.e., the cumulative number of CNs
associated with the cumulative number of SCRs written against the failed component).
Exploring the failed component - fixed component(s) relationship, led us to study how the
software architecture relates to the spread of fixes across components. Therefore, we have
re-arranged the order of components shown on the axes in Figure 9.2 specifically to reflect
the software architecture. Thus, the first component listed on both the Failed component
and Fixed components axes in Figure 9.2 is component 20, which is the single top level
component in the 3-level hierarchical architecture. Component 20 is then directly connected
to components 1, 17, 21, 19, 14, and 18 at level two, resulting in six groups of components
shown in Figure 9.2, annotated as A through F. The components that connect each group
to the top level component appear first in each of the groups A through F. The remaining
components span the second and third levels in the architecture.
The main observations based on Figure 9.2 were:
• Fixes typically occurred in the failed component. As shown by the large values
on the diagonal the majority of CNs were tied to the same component against which
the originating SCR was written, which indicates that the failed component was at
the very least contributing some fault(s) to a potential failure. In total, 74% of CNs
were tied to the changes implemented in the same component against which the SCRs
was reported4. The remaining 25% of changes were implemented in a component other
than the one the SCR was written against. Thus, showing that one in every four faults
lies outside the component reportedly failing.
• A significant percentage of fixes were associated with the single top level
component, that is, component 20. 34% of the total number of CNs were imple-
mented as either a result of an SCR filed against component 20 or to make a change
4Note that because each SCR can have multiple CNs, although 82% of SCRs required changes only within
the failed component, only 74% of CNs were implemented within the failed components.
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Figure 9.2: The cumulative number of fixes in each components based on the cumulative
number of failures associated with the failed component
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to component 20 as a result of an SCR filed against another component. We also
noticed that the failed components that often led to fixes in component 20 tended to
be components at the second level of the hierarchy which connect each architectural
group (i.e., A through F) to the single top level component (i.e., component 20). This
observation suggests that the spread of fixes is related to the software architecture.
What is perhaps most interesting about exploring the failed - fixed component(s) rela-
tionship is the set of SCRs that required fixes outside the component against which the SCR
was filed. One would suspect finding and fixing faults outside this component would be more
difficult, as it is less intuitive. Therefore, we specifically analyze such SCRs. When further
exploring the spread of fixes that occurred outside the failed component we chose to include
open SCRs for which some fixes had been implemented because the change notices that are
yet to filed could only increase the spread of fixes. At the component level, it is very unlikely
that all changes made to a component would be complete reverted upon verifying the fix.
Thus, including open SCRs is still likely to be an understatement with respect to the spread
of fixes across components, as additional change notices can only increase the spread of fixes.
Figure 9.3 is similar to Figure 9.2 but included data for both opened and closed SCRs5,
while the fixes that were implemented in failed components (i.e., data points that lie on the
diagonal in Figure 9.2) were removed so that patterns off the diagonal that reflect changes
outside the failed component could be explored. Note that the scale on the z-axis which
shows the cumulative number of CNs has changed. The following interesting observations
with respect to the effect of the software architecture on the distribution of fixes were made
based on Figure 9.3):
• Changes to components in group F were the most frequent and typically
localized within group F. In other words, SCRs filed against components from
Group F rarely led to fixes outside the group. Further, we noticed that either of
component 8 or component 16 failures are likely to result in fixes in the other. The
most prominent exception from the changes being localized within group F is the large
number of failures of component 18 that affected component 20, which can be explained
by the fact that component 18 is the component at the second level which connects
5Once again, we note that we repeated the analysis for the claims made thus far and confirmed that
the major trends did not change. Further, it remains true that about 18% of open and closed SCRs led to
changes outside the components against which the SCR was written, which is the same percentage of closed
SCRs.
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Figure 9.3: The cumulative number of fixes that led to changes outside the failed component
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group F to component 20.
• Fixes typically remained within the architectural group. 74% of fixes that
occurred outside the failed component remained within the architectural groups. How-
ever, failures in some components required fixes to other groups. For example, a failure
in component 2 may require fixes in almost any other component. In fact, only com-
ponent 19 has never been fixed as a result of a failure in component 2. Additionally,
failures in component 6 (which belongs to group A) were likely to cause changes in
group B. According to project personnel this can be explained by the fact that func-
tional groups are interconnected to perform overall integrated mission operations.
• Components with similar functionally showed similar change patterns. Com-
ponents 4, 5, 6 and 12 which are similar in terms of their functionality showed very
similar change patterns across all failures, as was also the case for components 14 and
15.
These result suggest that software architecture has an impact on the distribution of fixes
among different groups of components. According to project personnel this information is
useful for conceptualizing integrated independent analysis tests. Further benefit may come
from identifying non-typical behaviors, such as for example the fact that the number of
changes in group F also high, or that failures linked to component 2 may lead to changes in
almost any other component. These observations can be useful in increasing the efficiency
of fixing future faults by helping the developers and verification and validation personnel to
identify components that typically change together.
9.2 Types of Software Artifacts Fixed
Faults contained within any of the software artifacts used throughout the development
life cycle can potentially cause a failure. Since analysis techniques can be specific to certain
artifacts (e.g., testing of code versus manual analysis of code or requirements) we explored
the distribution of faults across artifacts to answer the following research question:
RQ4–B: Which types of software artifacts were fixed most often?
Quantifying these trends could help managers allocate resources accordingly. Each CN
identified the software artifact that was fixed in the ‘affected product’ field. This is a free-
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text field and thus, the level of detail describing each artifact varied greatly; in some cases
specific file names or documents names were given, while in other cases there were only high
level descriptions. Based on domain expertise of project personnel, we grouped the artifacts
into the following categories:
• requirements documents (e.g., detailed requirement specifications)
• design documents (e.g., high-level design overviews)
• code files (e.g., Ada files)
• supporting files (e.g., pre-defined look up tables)
• tools (e.g., testing, simulation and configuration tools)
• notes (Notes are written for the onboard crew to help prevent known failures, for exam-
ple, by instructing the crew to avoid or alter certain command sequences. Therefore,
a note can be considered to be a work-around)
• waivers (Waivers on the other hand are written to acknowledge that a requirement
cannot be met and that the mission is currently willing to accept the limitation.)
74% of the non-conformance SCRs identified only one type of artifact (although in some
cases multiple instances of a single type of artifact were changed, such as two different
requirement documents), 20% identified two types of artifacts, and slightly less than 6%
identified three or more types of artifacts affected by fixes. Hence, in addition to exploring
which single type of artifacts were fixed most often, we also explored which types of affected
artifacts were often fixed together.
The venn diagram in Figure 9.4 shows the common types of artifacts and groups of
artifacts fixed by changes6. We made the following observations with respect to the types of
artifacts fixed:
• The vast majority of SCRs resulted in changes to requirements, code, or
the combination of both. Specifically, 39% of the SCRs resulted in changes to the
requirements only (no other types of artifacts were affected), 33% resulted in changes
6The groupings shown in Figure 9.4 account for over 94% of the SCRs that identified artifacts changed.
The reminding 6% of the SCRs cannot be shown in Figure 9.4 because of the extremely small percentages
spread across less common groupings.
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Figure 9.4: Types of artifacts fixed
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to code and no other artifacts, and 14% required changes in both the requirements and
the code.
• The supporting files were almost always changed in conjunction with other
artifacts. Thus, while only around 0.6% of SCRs led to changes only in supporting
files, 5% resulted in changes in code and supporting files and 3% resulted in changes
in requirements, code, and supporting files.
• The percentage of SCRs that led to changes in design artifacts was rather
small. Almost half of the SCRs that do not appear in Figure 9.4 (i.e., around 3%
overall) required changes in at least some design artifact(s). The small percentage of
SCRs linked to changes in design documents may to some extent be due to the fact
that the mission did not maintain detailed design documents and according to project
personnel when code changes impacted only a few lines, the design documents would
not be updated.
• Workarounds were sometimes used to prevent failures from reoccurring.
The analysis of the artifacts fixed showed that less than 2% of SCRs identified notes
and/or waivers as fixed artifacts. At first this seemed surprising for a large safety-
critical system that required sustained engineering; however, project personnel pointed
out an additional change document, which was stored solely for the purpose of tracking
workarounds. Initial analysis of this documented showed that were around were more
commonly used (i.e., 26% of the SCRs for which fixes where analyzed were associated
with these additional documents).
9.3 Types of Artifact Fixed per Fault Type
We suspect that the fault type responsible for causing a (potential or actual) failure may
be correlated with the type of artifacts affected by the fixes. For example, a requirement
fault is likely to lead to change in requirements. However, the association is not trivial since
for example a requirement fault should also lead to changes in the source code if it was
discovered after the code was implemented. Hence, we explored research question:
RQ4–C: Is there any relation between the type of fault that causes a failure and
the types of artifacts that need to be fixed?
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Figure 9.5: Frequency counts for types of artifacts fixed per major fault type
To explore the association between the types of artifacts affected by fixes and the fault
types that caused individual failures, we tested the following null hypothesis:
H80: The artifacts fixed are unrelated to fault type.
By calculating χ2 = 609.21, and then C = 0.57, Cmax = 0.91, and C
∗ = 0.63 we reject
H80 in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the type of affected artifacts are correlated
with fault types. The correlation is strong and statistically significant at 0.05 significance
level. The correlation between fault types and types of affected artifacts is twice that of any
other correlation between fault and failure attributes measured in Chapter 7.
The 3-dimensional plot in Figure 9.5 shows the frequency counts of the common types or
group of types of affected artifacts for each major fault type. Table 9.3 shows the correspond-
ing data presenting the actual numbers (and percentages in brackets) of non-conformance
SCRs for each fault type that led to changes in the common grouping of artifacts.
With respect to major fault types we made the following observations:
• The majority of coding faults were fixed by changing the code only. 66% of
the failures that were caused by coding faults (i.e., 22% of the total non-conformance
SCRs) resulted in a change only in the code and no other type of artifact. This is
the highest percentage among all combinations of fault type and affected artifacts.
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Fault Type
Types of
Artifacts Requirements Design Coding Integration Other Total
Fixed
Requirements 251(19.97) 4(0.32) 27(2.15) 199(15.83) 9(0.72) 490(38.98%)
Requirements 9(0.72) 1(0.08) 4(0.32) 2(0.16) 0(0.00) 16(1.27%)
Design & Code
Requirements 86(6.84) 10(0.80) 52(4.14) 23(1.83) 7(0.56) 178(14.16%)
& Code




Code 41(3.26) 33(2.63) 281(22.35) 26(2.07) 29(2.31) 410(32.62%)
Code & 6(0.48) 8(0.64) 29(2.31) 14(1.11) 1(0.08 58(4.61%)
Supporting
Files
Other 20(1.59) 9(0.72) 22(1.75) 6(0.48) 9(0.72) 66(5.25%)
Total 429(34.13%) 69(5.49%) 424(33.73%) 279(22.20%) 56(4.46%) 1,257(100%)
Table 9.3: Frequency counts for types of artifacts fixed per major fault type
An additional 27% of the failures caused by coding faults (i.e., 7% of the total non-
conformance SCRs) resulted in changes to the code, as well at least one other type of
artifact. Surprisingly, we notice from Figure 9.5 that in some cases a coding fault may
be fixed by fixing requirements only, that is, 6% of failures caused by coding faults (i.e.,
2% of total non-conformance SCRs) resulted in changes to requirements only. This can
be explained by the nature of the software developed by NASA. NASA missions do
things for the first time and hence experience discovery of requirements throughout
development, testing and even operation. Accordingly to the project personnel in
these few cases the code may be implemented and/or updated on the fly and then the
SCR was written to update the requirements to match the code. Similar observation
related to discovery of requirements later in the life cycle was made for other NASA
missions [45].
• The majority of requirements faults were fixed by changing requirements
only. Table 9.3 and Figure 9.5 show that 59% of failures caused by requirement
faults (i.e., 20% of the total non-conformance SCRs) resulted in changes in requirement
artifacts and no other type of artifact. This suggests that a large portion of requirement
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faults are caught before the code for that faulty requirement was implemented. On
the other hand 20% of failures caused by requirement faults (i.e., close to 7% of the
total non-conformance SCRs) led to changes in requirements as well as code, and
additional 4% (i.e., just over 1% of the total non-conformance SCRs) led to changes
in requirements, code, and supporting files. For these 8% of the SCRs it appears the
requirement faults, which can be incorrect or missing requirements, were detected later
in the life cycle. Interestingly we also notice that some requirements faults were fixed
by changing the code only (i.e., 10% of failures caused by requirement faults, that is,
about 3% of the total non-conformance SCRs). This may indicate situations in which
the requirement was unclear but the code was the only artifact affected due to lower
level implementation details not included in requirements documents.
• Integration faults often led to changes in requirement documents. 72% of fail-
ures associated with integration faults (i.e., close to 16% of the total non-conformance
SCRs) resulted in changes to requirements documents only. This can be explained
by the fact that this NASA mission relies directly on program, instrument, and com-
mand lists which are implemented through requirements documents and directly affect
software executions as they define commands and/or values to be used in certain con-
ditions. Clearly, an emphasis should be put on defining, reviewing, and testing these
commands and values which potentially would led to less integration faults. In general,
more analysis and/or inspection conducted on all current integration requirements may
be beneficial.
• Design faults typically led to changes in code, often in combination with
other artifacts. 48% of the failures caused by design faults (i.e, below 3% of the total
non-conformance SCRs) led to changes in only code and an additional 33% (i.e, 2% of
the total non-conformance SCRs) led to changes in code as well as at least one other
type of artifact (e.g. code and supporting files, or requirements, design, and code).
According to project personnel, this can be explained by the fact that this NASA
mission did not use very detailed design, and so design decisions were often directly
implemented at the coding level.
• Uncommon fault types most often led to changes in code only. Fault types
that were rare (e.g., i/o problems, simulation problems, fabrication/ manufacturing
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faults each accounted for less than 1% of non-conformance SCRs) were grouped into
the other fault type category. Figure 9.5 shows that these fault types typically require
changes to the code only.
Based on the analysis of the association between fault types and affected artifacts con-
ducted, we emphasize several points which may benefit the NASA mission and potentially
contribute towards more cost efficient improvement of software quality.
• Compiling a checklist of common coding faults and incorporating it in the
development and verification and validation process may significantly de-
crease the number of coding faults, and thus the overall number of non-
conformance SCRs. As noted earlier, 66% of the failures that were caused by coding
faults (i.e., 22% of the total non-conformance SCRs) resulted in changes only in the
code and no other type of artifact. This suggests that a large portion of coding faults
are due to coding errors and may be avoided by compiling a checklist with common
coding errors. Similar effort in Lucent Technologies decreased the number of coding
faults by 34.5%, reduced the average testing effort by 18.3%, and shortened the devel-
opment interval by 8.3%. The total saving due to reduced product rework and testing
was seven million US dollars [68].
• Some faults may have been detected earlier. Based on the results presented in
Figure 9.5 and Table 9.3, we were able to identify several groups of SCRs that may have
been revealed earlier. These include 20% of failures caused by requirement faults (i.e.,
7% of the total non-conformance SCRs) which led to changes in both requirements
and code, and an additional 4% (i.e., just over 1% of the total non-conformance SCRs)
which led to changes in combination of requirements, code, and supporting files, and
18% of the failures which were linked solely to changes in the code (i.e., close to 6%
of the total non-conformance SCRs) but were actually caused by requirement faults or
design faults. Theoretically, these requirements faults have a potential to be detected
earlier (i.e., as early as the requirements phase) before they have been implemented
thus would not have required fixes to other artifacts. Further exploration of such
SCRs by domain experts may lead to earlier detection of faults. However, it should be
noted in case of NASA missions earlier detection of requirement faults is not always
feasible as some requirements will always remain to be discovered under the unknown
circumstances that come with exploring the unknown for the first time.
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9.4 Types of Artifacts Fixed per Verification Activity
Once again we were specifically interested in characterizing the high priority failure class
of post-release failures. In this section we investigate how fixes differ in terms of artifacts
fixed for pre-release and post-release (i.e., on-orbit) failures to answer the following research
question:
RQ4–D: Is there any relation between the verification activity that revealed the
fault(s) and the types of artifacts fixed?
Formally, we tested the following hypothesis:
H90: The types of artifacts fixed are unrelated to pre/post-release
detection.
By calculating χ2 = 26.96, C = 0.15 we see that Cmax = 0.81 and C
∗ = 0.18, we reject
H20 in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the affected artifacts are correlated with the
pre/post release detection. Although the measured correlation is weak, it is statistically
significant at significance level of 0.05. Table 9.4 shows the percentage of failures discovered
pre- and post–release for the common groups of affected artifacts. It should be noted that, as
in case of any good quality, operational software, the sample size of post-release failures (i.e.,
on-orbit failures) is significantly smaller (i.e., 42 SCRs) than the sample size of potential
failures prevented by fault detection and removal activities (i.e., 1,215 SCRs).
Table 9.4 shows that the majority of post-release failures (i.e., 50%) resulted in changes
to source code only, which was not surprising considering the fact that 53% of post–release
failures were caused by coding faults (see chapter 7.2. Thus, as expected the fact that the
majority of coding faults were fixed by changes to just code is true for post-release failures
as well as pre-release failures. Thus, we emphasize the potential of focusing on detect coding
faults earlier in the life cycle by implementing and/or updating coding checklists used during
development process and verification and validation activities.
9.5 Types of Artifacts Fixed for Safety–critical Failures
In this section we focus on the high priority safety-critical failure class. Specifically, we
investigated whether different types of artifacts were fixed for safety-critical failures than for
non-critical failures and explored the following research question:
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Artifacts Fixed % of % of On-
Development orbit SCRs
& Testing SCRs
Code only 32.03 50.00
Requirements only 39.92 11.90
Requirements and 14.24 11.90
code
Code and 4.20 16.67
supporting files
Requirements, code, 3.13 2.38
and supporting files
Requirements, design, 1.32 0.00
and code
Other 5.19 7.14
Table 9.4: Artifact fixed pre- and post-release
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RQ4–E: In terms of the artifacts fixed, do safety–critical failures differ from non-
critical failures?
To answer this question we formulated and tested the following null hypothesis:
100: The artifacts fixes are unrelated to the severity of the (potential)
failure.
By calculating χ2 = 295.69, C = 0.43, Cmax = 0.87, and C
∗ = 0.50 we reject H110
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the type of software artifacts fixed are correlated
with the severity level of failures. The measured correlation is moderate and statistically
significant at 0.05 level.
Further observations about the association of software artifacts fixed and the severity
level of (potential or actual) failures can be made based on the frequency counts of the
common groups of affected artifacts for critical, non-critical, and unclassified failures shown
in the 3-dimensional plot in Figure 9.6. The main observations were as follows:
• The relative contribution of failures that led to fixing multiple types of
artifacts was more significant within the class of safety-critical failures than
within the class of non-critical failures. Over 67% of safety–critical failures led
to changes in multiple types of artifacts, while only 29% of non-critical failures led to
changes in multiple types of artifacts. This observation may be explained by several
reasons such as (1) a larger percentage of on-orbit safety-critical failures occur when
all software artifacts (including the code) exist and thus need to be changed to fix the
problem, (2) safety–critical failures sometimes may be more complex than non-critical
failures, and (3) safety–critical failures may sometimes be better documented than
non-critical failures.
• The relative contribution of failures that required changes in supporting
files was more significant within the class of safety-critical failures than
within the class of non-critical failures. Specifically, 24% of safety-critical failure
resulted in changes to the code and supporting files group compared to only 3% of
non-critical failures. Additionally, 18% of safety-critical failures resulted in changes to
the requirements, code, and supporting files group compared to only 2% of non-critical
failures.
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Figure 9.6: Frequency counts for types of artifacts fixed per severity level
• Safety-critical failures rarely led to changes in requirement artifacts only.
Although rare, safety–critical failures may lead to changes in requirements only. Specif-
ically, 4% of safety-critical failures led to changes only in requirements, which can be
explained by the instrument program command lists used by the mission. Theses lists
define commands and values to be used under certain conditions and thus are read
directly during operation. When discussing the types of affected artifact with project
personnel these instrument program command lists were considered to be requirements,
however we note that in this cause a change to this requirements document can di-
rectly affect the software’s execution behaviors under pre-defined conditions. It should
be noted that, as in case of on-orbit failures, the sample size of safety-critical failures
is significantly smaller (i.e., 127 SCRs) than the sample size for non-critical failures
(i.e., 711). Therefore, the above observations are supposed to be taken with caution
and should further be confirmed on additional safety–critical failures from this or other
missions.
9.6 Fix Effort
A significant amount of effort in any major software development project is spent on
verification and validation methods. Further, it has been estimated that changes due to
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maintenance and rework account for between 60 and 80 percent of total development costs
[35]. Thus it is obvious that projects could benefit significantly from decreasing the effort
spent on verification activities, maintenance and/or fixing faults.
In the NASA mission CNs have an effort field for the analyst to record the time spent
implementing the changes described within that CN. As defined in section 2 the fix effort
represents the total effort in hours spent implementing fixes for all the change notices as-
sociated with an individual SCR. Of the 1,257 closed SCRs , 92% (i.e., 1,153) recorded the
effort spent implementing changes; cumulatively these 1,153 SCRs took 17,500 hours to fix7.
Quantifying the effort spent implementing fixes per component, as well as per individual
failure, could be useful in helping to predict future fix effort and identify where the most
room for improvement is. Thus, we explored how the effort spent implementing fixes was
distributed across features. First we explored the distribution of effort per component and
then per SCR to answer the following research question:
RQ4–F: Is the effort spent implementing fixes uniform per SCR? per component?
If not, what are the common characteristics of fixes that required the most effort?
Thus, be began by exploring the relationship between the size of each component (given
KSLOC), the number of SCRs written against the component, and the number of cumulative
hours spent fixing faults in that component as shown in Figure 9.7. Each dot in the Figure
9.7 represents a component. Earlier we found that larger components tend to have more
SCRs filed against them [37] and consequently we now see more cumulative effort was spent
fixing these components. The pairwise relationships between between the number of SCRs
and the fix effort, the size (KSLOC) and fix effort, and the size (KSLOC) and number of
SCRs, are shown in Figure 9.8. As expected, the largest component (i.e., component 20)
had the most SCRs and accounted for more of the total fix effort than any other component.
Figure 9.9 provides a histogram of the fix effort per individual failure on a logarithmic
scale. The median effort spent per SCR was 3 hours, and values ranged from 0 to 1,193
hours (1% SCRs reported 0 hours). By sorting the SCRs based on the number hours spent
implementing fixes we found evidence of the Pareto principle, that is, 20% of that SCRs
account for 83% of the total amount of fix effort, which indicates of a skewed distribution.
Thus, although fixing the faults associated with most of the SCRs required little effort (in
7In total, these 1,153 SCR took 2,140 hours to report based on the SCR effort field discussed in Section
6.4.
Margaret L. Hamill Chapter 9. Investigation of Fixes 96

































Figure 9.7: Relationships between component size (in KSLOC), the cumulative number of
SCRs filed against the component, and the cumulative effort spent fixing the component
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Figure 9.8: 2 dimensional projections for the 3 dimensional plot shown in Figure 9.7
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Figure 9.9: Fix effort per individual failure histogram
the range of several hours), some rare SCRs required a much more significant amount of
effort (hundreds or even thousands of hours).
9.6.1 High Fix effort
As expected, fix effort was not uniformly distributed across components or SCRs. Fur-
ther, we explored fix effort with respect to the fault types that caused the failures and the
artifacts fixed, as well as, the fix effort associated with high-priority failure classes (i.e., post-
release failures, and safety–critical failures) and the fix effort with respect to the spread of
fixes (i.e, the number of components fixed and the number of types of artifacts fixed).
Fix effort with respect to fault type and types of artifacts fixed
Based on the result presented in Section 9.3 we know that there is a statistically significant
association between fault type and types of artifacts fixed. Here we investigate how fix effort
is distributed across these categories.
Table 9.5 shows the distribution of the effort spent for the major fault types and major
groups of fixed artifact types8; Table 9.6 shows the number of instances in each category.
More interestingly, Figure 9.10 and Table 9.7 show the effort per fault type and fixed artifact
type normalized by the number of instances in each category, that is, the total hours spent
8Table 9.3 shows very similar information but for SCRs with CNs rather than just those with recorded
effort values
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Fault Type
Types of
Artifacts Requirements Design Coding Integration Other
Fixed
Requirements 868.7 10.1 182.3 1,734.7 58.5
Requirements 360.2 280.0 10.4 31.0 0.0
Design & Code
Requirements 1,540.5 136.2 2,250.9 386.1 132.6
& Code




Code 1,274.6 284.0 2,150.6 71.4 105.2
Code & 320.1 41.6 921.0 420.9 32.0
Supporting
Files
Other 170 22.2 387.9 810.9 45.5
Table 9.5: Total effort spent per fault type and fixed artifact group
Figure 9.10: Cumulative effort (in hours) spent per fault type and fixed artifact group
per category divided by the number of SCRs in that category which represents the mean
effort spent per category.
Our main observations include:
• Requirement faults caught early typically required less effort to fix. As
expected, it can be seen that requirements faults which were corrected by only fixing
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Fault Type
Types of
Artifacts Requirements Design Coding Integration Other
Fixed
Requirements 249 4 27 199 9
Requirements 8 2 1 2 0
Design & Code
Requirements 87 9 56 23 8
& Code




Code 32 25 216 19 22
Code & 6 8 30 14 1
Supporting
Files
Other 19 9 20 6 4
Table 9.6: Total number of SCRs per fault type and fixed artifact group
Fault Type
Types of
Artifacts Requirements Design Coding Integration Other
Fixed
Requirements 3.5 2.5 6.9 8.7 6.5
Requirements 45.0 140.0 10.4 15.5 0.0
Design & Code
Requirements 17.7 15.1 40.2 16.8 16.6
& Code




Code 39.8 11.4 10.0 3.8 4.8
Code & 53.4 5.2 30.7 30.1 32.0
Supporting
Files
Other 9.3 2.5 19.4 135.2 11.4
Table 9.7: Mean effort per failure spent for each fault type and fixed artifact group
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requirements on average required considerably less effort per SCR than requirements
faults that led to fixes in multiple types of artifacts. For example, 3.5 hrs/SCR for
fixes in requirements early versus 17.7 hrs/SCR or more for requirements faults that
led to changes in requirements and code.
• Coding faults that led to changes only in code or only requirements required
a relatively low effort to fix compared to other coding faults, that is, on average
less than 10 hours and 7 hours respectively, while other ranged between 20 and 40hrs9.
• Some categories required more effort to fix than others. For example, it can be
seen that SCRs due to requirements faults and also SCRs due to integration faults that
led to changes in requirements, code and supporting files required a relatively high effort
to fix (i.e., over 80 hours per SCR). However, it should be noted that these observations
are each based on few SCRs, but were expected based on the skewed distribution that
has large value observations with small, but non-negligible probability.
9.6.2 Fix effort for high-priority failures
Fixing high-priority post-release (i.e, on-orbit) and/or safety-critical failures is very im-
portant despite the fact that each occurs rarely. To the best of our knowledge whether or
not such high priority fixes require more effort to fix has never been explored. Thus, we
investigated how the fix effort differs for SCRs reported pre-release (i.e., during development
and testing) versus those reported post-release (i.e., on-orbit), as well as for safety-critical
versus non-critical SCRs.
Table 9.8 and Table 9.9 show the distribution of fix effort for safety-critical/non-critical
failures and pre/post release failures, respectively. Since mean and standard deviation can
be sensitive to outliers (i.e., do not represent skewed distributions well) we also considered
the median and the Semi Interquartile Range (SIQR) (a measure of dispersion around the
median)10.
9Coding faults that led to changes in design, requirements & code showed a normalized effort 10.4 hrs
per SCR, but only only one SCR fell into this category. On the other hand, 216 SCRs linked to coding faults
led to changes only in code and 27 SCRs linked to coding fault led to changes only in requirements
10The semi-interquartile range is a measure of spread or dispersion. It is computed as one half the
difference between the 75th percentile (often called (Q3)) and the 25th percentile (Q1). The formula for semi-
interquartile range is therefore: (Q3-Q1)/2. Since half the scores in a distribution lie between Q3 and Q1,
the semi-interquartile range is 1/2 the distance needed to cover 1/2 the scores. In a symmetric distribution,
an interval stretching from one semi-interquartile range below the median to one semi-interquartile above
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# of SCRs Total Meaneffort Standard Median Effort SIQR
Verification Effort per SCR Deviation per SCR
Activity
Pre-release 1,116 15,609.9 14.0 43.9 3 4.5
Post-release 37 1,881.9 50.9 195.6 7 12.5
Table 9.8: Effort spent fixing faults for pre- and post-release failures
# of SCRs Total Mean effort Standard Median Effort SIQR
Severity Effort per SCR Deviation per SCR
Safety- 122 5,549.4 45.5 120.5 10.5 22.0
critical
Non- 650 9,463.1 14.6 49.8 4.0 5.0
critical
Unclassified 381 2,479.1 6.5 13.0 2.0 1.5
Table 9.9: Effort spent fixing faults for safety critical, non-critical and unclassified failures.
Based on 9.8 and Table 9.9 we made the following observations:
• Post-release failures tend to require more effort to fix than pre-release
failures. From data given in Table 9.8 it can be seen that post-release failures required
on average three times the effort per SCR to fix than pre-release failures. The larger
median and larger SIQR support the observation that post-release failures require more
effort to fix, with significantly higher variability. We suspect the extras time spent
fixing post-release failures is actually a result of the fact that more artifacts existed
and analysts may documented high priority failures more carefully.
• Safety-critical failure tend to require more effort to fix than non-critical
failures. From the data given in Table 6 it can be seen that fixing safety–critical
failures on average required three times the effort of fixing non–critical failures. Even
the median effort per safety-critical SCR was significantly larger and more variable
than the median effort to fix non-critical failure. However, we note that this may
be due a result of analysts who document safety-critical failures more carefully than
non-critical failures because of the importance in preventing them from (re)occuring.
the median will contain 1/2 of the scores. This will not be true for a skewed distribution, however. The
semi-interquartile range is little affected by extreme scores, so it is a good measure of spread for skewed
distributions. However, it is more subject to sampling fluctuation in normal distributions than is the standard
deviation and therefore not often used for data that are approximately normally distributed [21]
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# of types # of SCRs Total Mean effort Median Effort
artifacts fixed Effort per SCR per SCR
1 830 6,924.3 8.3 2
2 259 6,329.5 24.4 6
3 61 3,427.3 56.2 36.5
4 3 810.8 270.3 10.5
Table 9.10: Fix effort per number of different types of artifacts fixed.
9.6.3 Fix Effort with respect to the spread of the fix
Although, there was no data available detailing the size of the fixes in terms of lines
of code added or removed we believe one way to measure the difficulty of fixes may be
based on the spread of fixes across components and artifacts fixed. Intuitively, fixes that
involve several different types of artifacts and/or multiple components seem more complex
and thus, may require more effort. Thus, we quantify fix effort as a function of the number
of different types of artifacts fixes and the number of components fixed in Tables 9.10 and
9.11, respectively.
We made the following observations:
• Fixing multiple types of artifacts required more effort. As expected, Table 9.10
shows that as the number of types of artifacts increases from 1 to 4 the mean effort
per SCR increases significantly; 8.3 hours per SCR when one type of artifact was fixed
and almost 56.2 hours per SCR when three types of artifacts were fixed. Similarly, the
median effort per SCR also increased with the number of types of artifacts fixed. Note
that there were only three SCRs that led to fixing four different types of artifacts and
therefore those are not included in the discussion, but are provided in Table 9.10 for
completeness.
• Fixing multiple components required more effort. Over 16% of SCRs led to
fixes in multiple components. From Table 9.11 it can be seen that both the mean effort
per SCR and median effort per SCR increase as the number of affected components
increases from 1 to 4. Once again, it should be noted that the number of SCRs which
led to fixes in four or five components was very small.
Margaret L. Hamill Chapter 9. Investigation of Fixes 104
# of # of SCRs Total Mean effort Median Effort
components fixed Effort per SCR per SCR
1 968 10,730.9 11.1 2.0
2 155 5,035.3 32.5 10.3
3 23 1,406.6 61.2 17.0
4 5 304.0 60.8 53.1
5 2 15.0 7.5 7.5
Table 9.11: Fix effort per number of components fixed.
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Figure 9.11: Mean fix effort per failed and fixed components
9.6.4 Fix Effort with respect to the Failed-fixed Component Re-
lationship
We investigated how effort was distributed across fixed components in relation to the
failed component, as defined in section 9.1.1. The cumulative effort spent fixing each com-
ponent is shown in Figure 9.11 with respect to the failed component. Note that the compo-
nents have once again been arranged according to the hierarchical software architecture and
that each group (i.e., A though F) represents a group of components that are interconnected
to one another and connect to the single top level component (i.e., component 20) through
the first component listed in the group. For example, in Group A component 1 connects
components 6 and 12 to the top level component (i.e., component 20)).
We made the following observations:
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• Most effort was spent fixing the components the SCR was written against.
As expected the largest cumulative effort values fall on the diagonal. About 12% of
the effort spent fixing components was spent fixing components other than the one the
SCR was written against (i.e., the total effort off the diagonal in Figure 9.11).
• A significant portion of the effort was spent on the single top level com-
ponent. As expected, we see that the largest component, which also has the most
non-conformance SCRs filed against it, also had the most effort spent fixing it. Over
38% of the overal effort spent on fixing all 21 components was spent on fixing compo-
nent 20 for SCRs written against component 20.
• More effort was spent on components that connect architectural groups to
the top level component. It can be seen that components 1, 17, 18, 19, 14, 18 tend
to stand out among the rest in terms of effort spent. Additionally, fixing components
13, 15 and 16 required a considerable portion of effort.
As mentioned earlier (see section9.1, the majority of SCR lead to changes only within
the failed component, but some lead to changes in other components as well, and very few
lead only to changes in other components. Thus, we also explored how fix effort per SCR
differed in regard to the following groups:
• Group 1 (82% ) consists of SCRs that led to fixes only in the failed component (i.e.,
the component against which the SCR was filed)
• Group 2 (15%) consists of SCRs that led to fixes in the failed component, as well as
at least one other component.
• Group 3 (3%) consists of SCRs that did not lead to changes in component the SCR
was written against but did require changes in other components.
Table 9.12 shows the number of SCRs, the cumulative fix effort, and the mean and median
effort per SCR for each group.
As one would expect, both the mean and median effort were higher in the case when
the failed component and at least one more component were fixed than when only the failed
component was fixed. Surprisingly, however, when the suspected failed component was not
fixed at all (i.e., group 3) both the mean and median effort were the smallest. Note that
group 3 has the smallest sample size.
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Fix # of SCRs Total Mean effort Median Effort
Group Effort per SCR per SCR
Group 1 932 10,615.9 11.4 2.2
Group 2 181 6,717.9 37.1 11.0
Group 3 40 158.0 4.0 2.0




Data mining is an emerging field within software engineering that has recently received
quite a bit of attention. Data mining is used to extract patterns from data and involves
learning from such patterns to make predictions for future data. Up to this point the
analysis and observations were based on the assessment of individual features, pair-wise
association between two features, and rarely the interaction of three features (e.g., effort per
fault types for each group of fixed artifacts). In this chapter, we explore the possibility of
using features based on the information contained in an SCR to predict features of associated
fixes. Specifically, we explore the following research questions:
RQ5: Can traditional machine learning algorithms be used to predict features of fixes
based on fault and failure features entered in a non-conformance SCR?
A. Can we predict the types of artifacts that will need to be fixed?
B. Can we predict the components that will need to be fixed?
C. Can we predict the amount of effort required to implement the fix?
D. Can high priority failures classes be characterized by common features?
It is important to note, that we are not predicting typical fault or failure proneness as
most studies do (e.g., see [5] and references therein). Rather than predicting modules or
components that are fault prone, we focus on predicting characteristics of the fix after a
failure has occurred or fault was detected. The ability to predict the components to be fixed
and/or the artifacts to be fixed could help developers locate faults and implement fixes faster,
as well as help determine if fixes are complete (e.g., all necessary artifacts were fixed, and all
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necessary components were fixed). The ability to predict the effort required to implement
fixes would allow managers to schedule resources more efficiently and effectively as well as
help managers identify areas for improvement. For example, it may be possible to guide
development activities and/or verification activities towards methods focused on preventing
faults that required a significant amount of effort to fix.
This chapter proceeds by discussing the input features and response variables, and then
provides some background information for major data mining schemes and discusses the
applicability of each to our data and research questions. Finally, we present the results of
the data mining.
10.1 Features
The features describing and characterizing faults and failures (discussed in chapters 6
through 9) account for the majority of the input variables used. Based on the observation
made in Section 9.1.1 that fixes tend to remain within architectural groups we included
two additional input features representing the component’s location within the software
architecture. Specifically, we used the following features as input variables:
• Fault Type - the type of fault that caused the failure.
• Verification Activity - the verification activity taking place when the fault was
detected or failure was exposed.
• Severity - the impact of the failure.
• Failed Component - the component the non-conformance was reported against.
• Release - the software release of the failed component.
• Investigation Effort - the hours spent to report the non-conformance.
• Architectural Group - the architectural group to which to failed component belongs.
• Architectural Tier - the level within the three tier hierarchical architecture to which
the failed component belongs.
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It should be noted that almost all of the input features are categorical, with the exception of
severity (which is ordinal) and investigation effort (which is numeric). Additionally, we point
out that the architectural metrics are specific to the hierarchical structure and groupings of
components within the mission and thus may not be applicable to other architectures.
The following features characterizing fixes were explored as response variables:
• Fixed Artifacts - the types of artifacts affected by the fixes implemented to address
the non-conformance SCR.
• Fixed Architectural Group - the architectural groups affected by fixes implemented
to address the non-conformance SCR.
• Fix Effort - the total effort to implement the fixes described in all CNs associated
with an individual SCR. Although, fix effort is numeric attribute measured in hours
we choose to discretize the values in an attempt to predict whether high, medium or
low effort would be required rather than trying to predict the exact number of hours.
Predicting the exact number of hours needed is likely to be less accurate, especially
when considering the fact that almost all the input features were categorical. The
numerical values were discretized into three classes: high, medium, and low based a
typical logarithmic transformation. To be exact, the values were transformed by taking
the log of each value and then dividing the range of the logs by three (i.e., to map to
the three class values), which is a standard transformation for converting numerical
effort data into categorical data used in effort prediction [14]. Thus, effort values less
than 1.44 hours were consider low effort, those between 1.45 hours and 41.44 hours
were considered as medium effort and those with higher values were considered high
effort. This resulted in 339 low effort instances, 661 medium effort instances and 93
high effort instances.
10.2 Background on Data Mining
Typically data mining methods follow one of four different learning styles:
• Classification learning - takes a set of classified examples and attempts to learn a
way to classify unseen examples based on the association between input features and
the classification values. For example, classification learning could be used to predict
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whether a module is fault (or failure) prone based on the static code features which
have been associated with fault (or failure) prone modules based on the pre-classified
examples.
• Numeric Prediction - is a variant of classification learning where the output is
numeric. It attempts to predict a value of a given continuous valued variable using a
mathematical model based on the input features.
• Association learning - searches for relationships between attributes without consid-
ering a specified classification. For example, an online shopping site might gather data
on customer purchasing habits using association rule learning.
• Clustering - is like classification but the class value for each instance is unknown.
Thus, the algorithm will try to group similar items together based on a defined distance
measure for each attribute. For example, clustering could be used to group modules
based on common static code features without knowing whether the modules are fault
(or failure) prone.
The fact that the vast majority of features in our study are categorical limited the meth-
ods applicable. Clustering methods were not applicable because it was not possible to define
meaningful distance metrics (which are needed to determine the similarity (or difference)
between the categorical values) for the vast majority of input variables. Additionally, nu-
merical prediction techniques were not used, because the likelihood of accurately predicting
numeric values based on mainly categorical input features is very low. Thus, we explored
classification and association rule learning, which are described next. For more informa-
tion, on the tools and data mining methods the reader is referred to [66], which is the main
reference used throughout this chapter.
10.2.1 Background on Classification Rule Learning
Classification is a type of supervised learning that can be used on numerical or categorical
data. The fact that it is supervised implies that output (or class) variable is known for each
instance in the training data. Ideally, the learner identifies patterns in input values of
the training data that can be used to predict the class output value on test data. Two
commonly used types of classification algorithms are decision tree learners and probabilistic
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learners; both are state-of-the-art and tend to be computationally fast, thus we explored
the applicability of each. Decision tree learners produce human readable output in the form
of classification rules. These rules describe trends in the input data in relation to the class
output variable. Basically, the nodes of the tree are input features and the path (or branch)
followed from each node depends on the value of that feature. The leaf nodes identify the
class values. Rules are built for each path from root to leaf. To avoid over-fitting, branches
(and rules) can be pruned.
J48 is a decision trees algorithm implemented in WEKA [76] and is commonly used for
many classification problems. J48 builds decision trees from the training data using the
concept of information entropy. It uses the fact that each input feature of the data can be
used to split the data into smaller subsets. J48 examines the normalized information gain
(i.e., the difference in entropy) to choose which input feature to split on. Then the algorithm
recurs on the smaller subsets and the splitting procedure stops if all instances in a subset
belong to the same class or the minimum support value is reached, which results in the
creation of a leaf defining the class value. It may happen that none of the features give any
information gain. In that case J48 creates a decision node higher up in the tree using the
expected value of the class. J48 can handle both continuous and discrete (i.e,. categorical)
features and provides an option for pruning trees after creation. For further information, we
refer the reader to the original publications [59].
Probabilistic learners calculate the posterior probability of each class value given the
input values. One of the most commonly used probabilistic learner is NaiveBayes, which
uses Bayes Formula to calculate posterior probabilities and then assigns an input instance
the class value with the highest probability. It should be noted the Nave Bayes assumes
independence among input features, which is not the case for our input features. However,
despite the unrealistic assumptions Nave Bayes has been shown to work quite well in practice
(e.g. [27]). Thus, we decided to include the Nave Bayes classifier in the experiments [36].
To evaluate the prediction abilities of the J48 and NaiveBayes learners we ran typical 10
by 10 cross validation experiments. For the 10 by 10 cross validation the data was divided
into 10 partitions and the learner was trained on all but one partition and then tested
for accuracy on the remaining partition. This process was repeated 10 times; each time a
different partition was used to evaluate the learner. We use the ZeroR learner (which always
predicts for the majority class) as a baseline to evaluate the performance of both J48 and
NB in the 10 by 10 cross validation experiments. Clearly, to be useful J48 and NB should do
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Predicted Value
P’ N’
Actual P TP FN
Value N FP TN
Table 10.1: Actual versus predicted outcomes
a better job predicting class values then the learner that always predicts the majority class.
To compare the performance of the two learners, in other words to determine which
learner performed better (e.g., J48 or NaiveBayes) receiver operator curves (ROC curves)
are commonly used. ROC curves plot the false positive rate (FPR) on the horizontal axis
and the true positive rate (TPR) on the vertical access. In a binary class problem the FPR
is the ratio of false positives to the total number of negatives instances and true positive rate
is ratio of the true positives to the total number of positive instances. Table 10.1 shows the
how true positives (TP), false positives (FP), false negatives (FN) and true negatives (TN)
are defined based on the actual classification (rows) and predicted classification (columns).
Thus, FPR = FP/(FP + TN) and TPR = TP/(TP + FN).
Although, ROC are very powerful for measuring accuracy for binary class problems their
usefulness for multi-class problems is not as straightforward. In [49] and [38] it was shown
that three dimensional ROC curves could be useful for comparing tri-class problems by
calculating the volume under the curves, but applying this idea to larger class problems
increases the complexity quickly. To avoid this, it is possible to build two dimensional ROC
curves for each value of each class explored. However, this method can also become quite
tedious and difficult to evaluate as the number of class values increases beyond three or four
values. Thus, as suggested in [8], we also use Cohen’s kappa statistic to evaluate learner
performance on multi-class problems. The authors showed that there is a close relationship
between kappa and ROC Curves and suggested that kappa expresses important properties
of a point in the ROC curve rather than describing the curve in full. The kappa statistic,
K, is calculated as follows:
K = (P0−Pc)
(1−Pc)
where P0 is the total agreement probability (i.e., the accuracy) and Pc is the agreement




(i=1) P (xi.)− P (x.i)
where i is the number of class values and P (xi.) and P (x.i), are the column and row
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marginal probabilities, respectively. Kappa ranges from -1 to 1, with values less than 0 rep-
resenting no agreement between the actual and expected, and values closer to 1 representing
close agreement. Thus, learners with Kappa values close to 1 show better performance. Clas-
sification learning can be used to explore research questions RQ5–A, RQ5–B, and RQ5–C,
which explore the possibility to predict the artifacts fixed, components fixed and fix effort,
respectively.
10.2.2 Background on Association Rule Learning
Association rule learning is used to identify interesting relationships between features
in a data set. Unlike classification learning association rule learning is not concerned with
predicting a class or output variable, rather the purpose is to identify features from different
attributes that tend to occur together. Thus, although association rule learning could not
be used to help us explore research questions RQ5–A through RQ5–C, which focus on pre-
dicting a class value, we used them to look for associations amongst features that our earlier
assessment may have missed. In other words, we explored research question RQ5–D, which
was aimed at characterizing failures that required more effort to fix faults.
We used the well-known Apriori algorithm to mine association rules [76]. The Apriori
algorithm works by generating rules based on statistics of item co-occurrence. Co-occurrence
refers to instances where two or more items appear in the same context, and is referred to
as 1st-order association. It should be noted that association learning based on higher-order
associations is not consider in this dissertation and may lead to more interesting results. For
more information on the Aprior algorithm used the reader is referred to [4].
10.3 Prediction Results
In this section we present the results for both classification and association rule learning
based on experiments ran in WEKA.
10.3.1 Classification Rule Learning Results
We conducted classification learning for each response variable (i.e., artifacts fixed, ar-
chitectural groups fixed and fix effort). Using classification learners we addressed research
questions RQ5A through RQ5C, as follows:
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ZeroR J48 NaiveBayes
Fixed Artifact Group 25.50% 0 69.64% 0.57 67.91% 0.42
Fixed Architectural Group 42.32% 0 86.73% 0.84 85.68% 0.83
Fix Effort 57.33% 0 73.20% 0.47 66.87% 0.39
Table 10.2: Accuracy and Kappa values for the fixed artifact group, the fixed architectural
group, and the fix effort
Fixed Artifact Group ZeroR J48 NaiveBayes
Requirements 1 0.85 0.88
Requirement, Design, & Code 0 0 0
Requirements & Code 0 0.65 0.34
Requirements, Code, & Supporting Files 0 0.40 0.53
Code 0 0.76 .76
Code & Supporting Files 0 0.22 0.42
Other 0 0.09 0.10
Weighted Average 0.42 0.70 0.68
Table 10.3: Probability of detection for each fixed artifact group
• RQ5–A: Can we predict the types of artifacts that will need to be fixed?
• RQ5–B: Can we predict the components that will need to be fixed?
• RQ5–C: Can we predict the amount of effort required to implement the fix?
In each case, we used the values defined in chapter 9 for class values of response variables.
Table 10.2 shows the accuracy and kappa statistic for each learner (i.e, ZeroR (the baseline),
J48, NB) for the three response variables (i.e., types of artifacts fixed, architectural group
fixed, and fix effort). It should be noted, that each prediction model considered only one
class variable at a time, the others were removed from the data set. The associated recall
values (i.e., probability of detection, PD) are provided for each value of each class for the
three learners in Tables 10.3, 10.4, and 10.5. ROC curves are not provided for the artifacts
fixed and architectural group fixed because of the larger number of class values, but are
shown in Figure 10.1 for high, medium and low effort.
Based on Tables 10.2 through 10.5 we made the following observations:
• The group of artifacts to be fixed can be predicted. As shown in Table 10.2,
both J48 and NB outperformed ZeroR in terms of accuracy on 10 by 10 cross vali-
dation. Thus, since ZeroR always predicts for the majority class without considering
the input features, suggests that the input features used (i.e., fault type, verification
activity, architectural group, architectural tier, severity, and fix effort) were useful in
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Fixed Architectural Group ZeroR J48 NaiveBayes
A- 1 0.966 0.969
A-B- 0 0 0
A-B-C- 0 0 0
A-B-other 0 0 0
A-C- 0 0 0
A-C-F-other 0 0 0
A-C-other 0 0 0
A-D-other 0 0 0
A-E- 0 0 0
A-E-G- 0 0 0
A-E-other 0 0 0
A-G- 0 0 0
A-G-other 0 0 0
A-other 0 0.154 0.096
B- 0 0.946 0.966
B-C- 0 0 0
B-other 0 0.906 0.625
C- 0 0.966 0.971
C-D- 0 0 0
C-F-other 0 0 0
C-other 0 0 0
D- 0 0.958 0.958
D-other 0 1 0.5
E- 0 0.959 0.959
E-other 0 0.176 0.176
F- 0 1 0.976
F-other 0 0.143 0
G- 0 0.985 0.99
G-other 0 0 0
other 0 0 0
Weighted Average 0.255 0.867 0.857
Table 10.4: Probability of detection for each fixed architectural group
Fixed Artifact Group ZeroR J48 NaiveBayes
High 0 0.33 0.36
Medium 1 0.88 0.71
Low 0 0.59 0.68
Weighted Average 0.57 0.73 0.67
Table 10.5: Probability of detection for fix effort
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Figure 10.1: ROC Curves for (a) high fix effort, (b) medium fix effort and (c) low fix effort
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helping to predict the set of artifacts to be fixed. As suggested by the high recall (PD)
values for requirements, code, and code & requirements in Table 10.3 we suspected
the association identified earlier in section 9.3 between fault type and artifacts fixed
is heavily influential on the results. Thus, we re-ran the 10 by 10 cross validation
experiments for J48 and NB with fault type as the only input feature, which resulted
in accuracy of 82% with K = 0.74 for J48 and an accuracy of 80% and K = 0.72 for
NB, which suggests that to predict the artifacts fixed just the fault type should be
used and the additional input features create noise.
• The architectural group fixed can be predicted. Similarly to the case of artifact
fixed, both J48 and NB outperformed ZeroR. Once again as suggested by the high
recall (PD) values for single architectural groups (i.e, A, B, C, D, E, and F) we believe
the success was based on a relationship identified earlier, that is, the relationship
in section 9.1.1 between the failed and fixed components. However, re-running J48
and NB with only the failed component as an input feature resulted in slightly lower
accuracy values and kappa values, that is, 84% and K = 0.81 for J48 and 84% and
K = 0.82 for NB. This suggests that the failed component is a very good indication of
the fixed architectural group, but we note that considering additional input features
led to slightly better results. Thus, if the information characterizing the fault type,
verification activity, severity, and report effort are readily available each should be used
in the prediction model. However, if such information is difficult to obtain the effort
spent to do so is likely to outweigh the gain of including such data.
• The relative level of fix effort can be predicted. Once again, J48 and NB both
outperformed ZeroR. However, in this case we could not predict effort with similar
accuracy based only one input feature. Thus, it appears the data mining techniques
are most applicable here, which is why we included Figure 10.1, using a ROC curve
to compare J48 and NB, which shows that when predicting for the high effort SCRs
(which would be most useful in terms of allocating resources and planning purposes)
NB should be used as it consistently outperformed J48.
In addition to the manual feature selection (i.e., using only the fault type to predict
the fixed artifacts, and using the architectural group of the failed component to predict
the architectural groups fixed) we explored various feature subset algorithms available in the
WEKA. However, the performance of each learner decreased significantly, which is likely due
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to the relatively small number of features. The only exception was with respect to predicting
the artifacts to be fixed. Using the CFS best first feature subset selection algorithm we found
that using fault type, investigation effort and severity as the only input features resulted in
an accuracy on of 71% and K = 0.59 with very little change in the recall (PD) for each class
value. We suspect that fact the severity contributes to better predictions is a result of the
fact that high severity failures could be very likely to be better documented, thus a greater
number of different types of artifacts were fixed. Thus, we conclude that if machine learning
techniques are to be employed all available features should be used.
10.4 Association Rule Learning Results
We implemented the Aprior associate learner in WEKA to explore research question:
RQ5–D: Can high priority failures classes be characterized by common features?
We ran the Apriori association learner on the high priority failures class subsets and their
counterparts, that is, safety-critical failures, non-critical failures, and unclassified failures;
and pre- and post-release (i.e., on-orbit) failures. Additionally, in order to help characterize
failures associated with high fix effort and/or failures that lead to fixes spread across com-
ponent we also ran the learner on the following pre-defined subsets of SCRs: high fix effort
SCRs, medium fix effort SCRs and low fix effort SCRs; and failures that led to fixes outsides
the failed component and those that did not require fixes outside the failed component.
In each case the learner discovered rules with high support values. However, through
detailed examination of the rules it became apparent that we had already discovered the
most informative relationships through the pairwise correlation conducted in chapter 9. For
example, the correlation between fault type and the types of artifacts fixed led to multiple
rules with fault type on one side of the rule and the type of artifact fixed on the other.
Although, the rules often included an additional feature or two the support values did not
improve. Thus, it was clear the the underlying associations were the driving force for the
rules learned. We tried removing strongly correlated attributes (e.g., we would remove
either the architectural group fixed or the architectural group input feature) to see if more
interesting rules would be learned. However, as expected the support values dropped quickly.
In addition, similarly to [63], we mined the rules learned to consider only those that contained
features of interest (e.g., high fix effort) on the right side of the rules. However, once again
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the support values were extremely low. Thus, we conclude that although the association
rule learning did not add new observations it did serve to verify the statistical hypothesis
tested in chapter 9.
10.5 Discussion
The classification rules learning showed promising results in terms of predicting the
type(s) of artifacts fixed, the architectural group(s) fixed and the fix effort. In fact, the
accuracy and recall values for our prediction models were comparative to what others have
deemed successful in the past for fault and failure proneness predictions (for examples see
[5] and references there in).
The comparison of our results with other works that made predictions for fixes is more
difficult because the evaluation criteria used differed across studies. The work presented in
[16] and [17] predicted the files to be changed and the developer best suited to make the
changes using a ranking scheme and reported accuracy values in [16] and recall (PD) values
in [17] to evaluate the model. Our accuracy values were comparable or better than those
in [16] for all but one of the systems explored. Further, the weighted average recall values
for each of our class prediction variables (i.e., types of artifacts fixed, architectural group
fixed and fix effort) were far better than those reported across all predictions in [17] and
comparable when only the first N (i.e, 5,10,100) retrieval items were considered. We suspect
the difference in results is due to the fact that we consider all change requests that represent
failures while [16] and [17] consider all types of changes requests, including those made for
enhancements etc.
In [24], an order response model was used to predict the effort category (1 of 4) for each
fault correction effort. Based on Kendall’s Tau and concordanant/discordant measures the
authors claimed that the results were ‘very favorable’ and the model could be reasonably
applied to other systems. The work in [72], which also predicted the fix effort used the
magnitude of relative error (MRE) to evaluate the results. Although the MRE was on
average 7−23% for the original study it was considerably worse when the model was applied
to an additional study (i.e., 40− 159%). Text similarity was used in [65] to help predict fix
effort and the average absolute residual (AAR) was used to evaluate the model. The authors
note that the original results were poor, but applying thresholds to the nearest neighbors
approach led to better prediction. However, using their ideal threshold the only actually
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made predictions for 13% of the original data set.
Even though the comparison with related studies suggested our models did well it should
be noted that with respect to the types of artifacts fixed and the architectural groups fixed
similar results can be obtained using the input feature with the highest correlation value,
that is, fault type and failed component, respectively. With respect to the fix effort, we
believe that project managers could easily benefit from using simple data mining techniques
to predict SCRs the will required a high fix effort allowing him or her to adjust resources
and/or schedule as needed.
We believe these results could be very complementary to the recent research focused on
defining hierarchical aerospace ontologies of concepts and nomenclature to identify problem
type and/or equipment type tags [47]. Combining the two features consider in both work
could significantly improve prediction capabilities.
In [63] association rules were shown to be more effect for prediction the isolation effort,
however as noted in the paper the association learning was not straight forward as association
rule learning does not predict a specific class variable. Thus the authors have to review all
rules generated and select those that predicted for effort. We also tried this approach but
our rules did not generate reliable effort predictions
The association rule learning showed less interesting results as although multiple features
appeared in the rules it was clear that the pair-wise correlations discovered earlier was heavily
influential. Thus, it appears that association rule learning may not be useful to the developers




The validity of each of the conclusions reached is influenced by the design and imple-
mentation of the study. Thus, in this section we discuss the threats to the validity of our
conclusions. First, in section 11.1 we discuss internal validity and construct validity per fea-
ture analyzed to document how internal factors influenced the study and ensure we explored
(and tested) what we set out to. Additionally in section 11.2, we discuss the conclusion
(or statistical) validity which considers the methods used to evaluate what was tested and
determine if the conclusions are justified. Finally, in section 11.3 we discuss the external
validity which considers the generality of the results.
11.1 Internal and Construct Validity
In order to characterize faults, failures and fixes in a way that would be meaningful
to the mission as well as the larger software engineering community, we had to (1) choose
appropriate features to analyze and (2) define the categories of values for each features. The
study began with a detailed analysis of data fields in the change tracking database. Fields
from SCRs and CNs were identified based on the usefulness of the information contained in
the field and the quality of the data. Based on the fact that SCRs and CNs were filled out
by analysts who worked on different parts of the mission at different locations using various
methods, the recorded data varied in terms of quality and detail. Thus, we continually
interacted with project personnel who had the domain expertise to asses the quality of
recorded values and clarify any uncertainty around the meaning.
The analysis was conducted at the component level since change requests were filed at
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that level. Although it is possible that some characteristics that may exist at finer levels of
granularity (e.g. file level) were masked at the component we do not believe this invalidates
our results as we clearly identify the level of granularity used. On the other hand, we note
that the observations with respect to the architectural properties and spread of fixes may
not have been observed at a lower level.
The assessment was based on seven data fields from the non-conformance SCRs and
associated CNs (i.e., ‘source’, ‘discovered by’, ‘severity’, ‘SCR effort’, ‘affected products’,
‘CN component’ and ‘CN effort’). Based on rigorous exploration of each of these fields,
including detailed discussion with the project personnel, we mapped these fields directly to
seven features describing faults, failures and fixes, that is, fault type, verification activity,
severity, investigation effort, artifacts fixed, components fixed and fix effort, respectively.
Obviously the interpretation of the data values used in each field could influence the results
based on the groupings of feature values. Therefore, we took the time to ensure that we
thoroughly understood the data and we were not misinterpreting any values (which was not
a simple task since some formal definitions of field values were missing) and had project
personnel review groupings. The lack of formal definition of data fields and values was likely
due to the fact the change tracking system was designed many years ago and it was not
designed to facilitate such detailed analysis. The characteristics of each field differed, from
pre-defined mandatory values to free-text fields that were optional. Thus, we discuss each
data field and the associated values.
Fault types were based on the ‘source’ field and the values were selected from a predefined
list. The meanings of values were self-explanatory. Thus, we were able to easily combine the
13 values into 5 major fault types for statistical testing.
The categories of the verification activity (i.e., analysis, testing, inspections and audits,
on-orbit and others) based on the free-text ‘discovered by’ field were more difficult to assign
because there were over 100 unique values, which contained numerous abbreviations. Thus,
we identified the unique values and common acronyms and discussed each with project team
members to determine the major activities. It should be noted that the ‘analysis’ category
(which was the verification activity identified for 49% of SCRs) included only those SCRs
that were specifically tagged ‘analysis’ in the ‘discovered by’ field. Although, ‘analysis’
was one of the field values that lacked a formal definition, by manually exploring multiple
analysis SCRs and reviewing NASA Standards and Guidebooks we found analysis to include
various activities which involve analyzing different software artifacts (e.g., informal review or
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walkthroughs), which differ from more formal inspections (or audits) that required specified
steps to be taken, and roles to be assigned to individual reviewers [52]. It should be noted
that SCRs created based on non-conformance observed during testing may have also been
revealed through some type of analysis (e.g. code analysis) if the resources were available
to perform such analysis. Similarly to other studies (e.g., [1], [26], [43], and [45]), we could
not measure the amount of relative effort spent on each activity based on the available data,
thus we do not make claims that one activity performs better than another.
We handled the severity attribute with special care since it often constitutes a major
threat to validity based on the fact that severity can often by artificially inflated to call
attention to the problem reported. In fact, based on suggestions from project personnel we
explored the severity levels assigned to changes notices (CNs) in addition to the severities
assigned to the SCRs. This allowed us to verify and update previously classified severity
values. Despite the fact that the documents were typically filed out by two different ana-
lysts we observed very few differences between severity levels originally associated with the
SCRs and severity levels assigned to CNs. In the cases when they differed, based on the
recommendation made by the project analysts, we used the value associated with the change
notices, which was considered to be more accurate. Considering this additional severity field
in CNs allowed us to classify 78 previously unclassified SCRs.
The analysis of the component(s) fixed was based on the component field in the CNs.
Although this field is not based on a pre-defined list, the values were easily associated
with components. The fact that in some cases multiple CNs were linked to a single SCR
encouraged us to explore the relationship between the failed component (i.e., the component
against which the non-conformance was written) and the components that were fixed, which
we defined as the failed - fixed component(s) relationship. It should be noted that in a small
number of cases (i.e., only about 3% of SCRs) the ‘failed’ component was never actually
fixed, indicating that the component suspected to fail may not have been the actual cause
of the non-conformance to a requirement reported in the SCR, but rather just a catalysts
for the problem to surface. Based on the fact that there is often more than one way to
implement a fix and sometimes the quickest and easiest way to fix a problem is through a
different component we did not exclude these SCRs from the analysis as we expect this trend
may continue.
With respect to the artifact fixed, classifying values into categories was more difficult,
because similarly to the verification activity, the ‘affected product’ field was free text, with
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varying levels of detail from one SCR to the next. For example, in some cases a specific
requirement document or filename was given, but in other cases only a broad high-level
reference (e.g. ‘code’) was provided. The affected product fields contained over 100 unique
entries. Once again by manual exploration of the values and through detailed discussions
with the project personnel, we defined six categories representing the types of artifacts
fixed (i.e., requirements documents, design documents, code files, supporting files, tools, and
notes/waivers) and mapped each unique value to one of the categories.
Lastly, with respect to the effort data (i.e., investigation effort and fix effort) we consider
effort with respect to fault types, verification activity, severity, artifacts fixed and compo-
nent(s) fixed, which showed that distribution of effort per feature value differed compared
to then the distribution of the number of failures across each value.
In any case, we discussed the perceived meaning of values with multiple software engineers
to ensure that we were not misclassifying or misinterpreting fault types or activities. Further,
the software review board for the NASA mission, which is responsible for determining which
SCRs need to be addressed and for appointing an analyst(s) to handle individual SCRs,
follows a well defined process with procedures in place for tracking and maintaining SCRs.
Since considering features of fixes in relation to fault and failure features is a unique part
of our approach it is important to emphasize that the mission has a software review board
in place to help ensure SCRs are documented correctly and that the proposed solution for
an SCR is appropriate, which means the changes suggested will indeed address the problem
reported. Thus, the data values and our method for linking from failures and faults to fixes
are sound based on the explicit information contained within the change documents and the
well-defined relationship between them.
To limit the threats to the internal validity we called upon the domain expertise of
project personal who helped mitigate the threats discussed. We discussed our perceived
meaning of values with multiple software engineers to ensure that we were not misclassifying
or misinterpreting, or overlooking any pertinent data. Their input and feedback on our in-
terpretation of the results was incorporated throughout the course of our work. For example,
based on the fact that less than 2% of artifacts fixed contained references to notes and/or
waivers, we originally believed workarounds were very rare. However, based on suggestions
from the project personnel we explored additional type of change document, which showed
workarounds were used more commonly. Our experience shows that independent researchers
who may be lacking product specific domain knowledge can manage to work with real, large-
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scale case studies by working closely with the project personnel to ensure the data quality
and verify and validate the interpretation of the results.
11.2 Conclusion Validity
The methods used to measure the extent of correlation between features were carefully
chosen. In each case, we chose an appropriate statistical test based on the measurement scales
of the features and the validity of the underling assumptions of the tests. Additionally, all
formal statistical tests are based on random samples. The groupings for attribute values
(e.g., fault types, activities, severities, and affected artifacts) used in the statistical tests
were carefully chosen not only to support the internal validity (i.e, to accurately represent
the data), but also to allow future related studies to compare their findings to our results
in a meaningful and practically useful way. Although for each pair of features explored (i.e.,
verification activity and fault type, severity and fault type, verification activity and severity,
artifacts fixed and verification activity, and artifacts fixed and severity) we found statistically
significant associations, it should be noted that this does not necessarily imply a cause–effect
relationship.
The methods used to build prediction models were chosen based on the questions we
wanted to answer (i.e., RQ5 in Chapter 10), as well as the data values. Thus, we chose
learners that worked on nominal features and were applicable for making predictions for
multi-valued classes. We recognized that additional learners, parameter refinement and
other techniques may improve the prediction results and reserve this for future work.
It should be noted that by the nature of some of the features we study some of the
samples are very small (e.g., post-release or safety -critical failures). Specifically, only 3% of
the non-conformance SCRs were reported on-orbit and about 10% were safety-critical. In
other words, comparisons of pre- and post-release, and safety-critical and non-critical failures
were made on vastly different size samples; however, these are intrinsic characteristic of any
high-quality software. Similarly, with respect to the analysis within individual releases and
across multiple releases (i.e., chapter 8) the fact that the number of components explored
per release was small (i.e., eleven components per release for earlier releases and three or
four components for later releases) presents a threat to validity. For clarity, throughout the
text we noted the percentage within each class, as well as within the entire sample to avoid
misrepresenting the data.
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Additionally, it should be noted that some SCRs were still ’open’ during time of this
analysis and as with any data set not all ’closed’ instances contained entries for all data
fields studied. To eliminate the threat to validity due to missing data, lack of data or
incomplete data (i.e. SCRs that are yet to be fully fixed)in some section we consider subsets
of SCRs. However, whenever subsets were used we checked to ensure that the major trends
reported in the entire population still held true, and they did.
Some patterns in the data may be due to the processes used by the mission, the uniqueness
of the mission and constraints placed upon the project that cannot be accounted for in our
research. For example, our exploration of the relationship between the type of artifacts fixed
and fault/failure features led to the discovery of interesting sets of non-conformance SCRs,
such as SCRs that had the potential to be avoided or more efficiently detected by compiling
a list of common coding faults or SCRs that theoretically could have been reported earlier.
However, assuming that all requirement faults could have been discovered in the requirements
phase is somewhat unrealistic in case of NASA systems which are often developed to do
something for the first time which mean requirements inevitably will be discovered later in
the life cycle, during testing and/or in-field operation. Thus, in the next section we discuss
the generality of the results with respect to other studies.
11.3 External Validity
In many cases, the use of inconsistent (or not sufficiently precise) terminology associated
with software reliability and quality assurance introduces problems and makes meaningful
cross-study comparisons difficult. For this reason, we provided the definitions of the funda-
mental terms used throughout our work and spent the time to carefully interpret the results
of others.
In what follows we work through the most interesting results from each chapter to com-
pare and contrast related results.
In chapter 6 we explored the distribution of fault types, verifiation activities and severity
levels across failures. One of the most interesting results was that our work as well as other
studies (e.g., [7], [13], [23], [19], [22], [45], [43], [68]) clearly showed that some fault types
are more common than others. However, the earlier studies (i.e., [7], [13], [23]) found that
early life cycle faults (i.e., requirements and design faults) were more common, where as our
study was in agreement with the results of more recent studies (i.e., [19], [22], [45], [43],
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[68]) which showed later life cycle faults (i.e., coding and implementation faults) are at least
as common if not more common than early life cycle faults. We suspect the difference is
likely due to process improvements over the years with respect to defining requirements and
detailing design, as well as the increased size and complexity of systems. Further, we found
that the percent of post-release failures as well as the percent of safety-critical failures was
similar to that of others e.g., [26], [1], [43].
The analysis conducted in chapter 7 explored the pairwise associations between fault
type, verification activity and severity. Similarly to [43] we found that the common fault
types persisted from pre to post-release. Additionally, we found that coding faults were the
most common causes of operational failures and safety-critical failures. To the best of our
knowledge no other works consider such a relation, which is also true with respect to the
verification activities associated with each fault types and with different severity levels.
In Chapter 8 we explored how trends change across and within releases. Once again
our results agreed with some studies, and disagreed with others. Specifically, similarly to
[11], [1] we found evidence suggesting that there was a positive correlation between pre– and
post–release faults, while others [26], [54] suggested the opposite result, that is, modules with
the most pre–release faults are not the most likely place for post–release faults. Our results
with respect to fault (or failure) persistence across releases differed from the results in [11],
[54] and [58] which found that faulty files persisted across releases. We believe the reason for
inconsistent results may be due to the various levels the studies were conducted at (e.g., file
level, module level, and component level) and the systems studied as well as the development
processes followed. However, the studies did not contain enough detailed information for us
to explain such differences with certainty. Once again it is obvious additional research is
needed.
Although, the related studies discussed in Chapter 3 did not specifically focus on char-
acterizing fixes as we did in Chapter 9, many of the works showed support for some of the
observations we made. In particular, with respect to the fact that some failures map to mul-
tiple faults, [45], [43], [1], [26] and [24] each made statements suggesting they too observed
instances where individual failures were linked to multiple faults. Further, similarly to our
results [24] showed that when related faults were spread across components more effort was
required to implement fixes. To the best of our knowledge, no other work has related the
spread of fixes to the architecture.
The observations made with respect to predictions in chapter 10 are unique in that no
Margaret L. Hamill Chapter 11. Threats to Validity 129
other study considered types of artifacts fixed or the architectural groups fixed, and input
features used across studies varied. However, [16], [17], [47], [62], [24], [72], [65], [63], and
[48] all showed some promising results with respect to predicting features of fixes; from the
files fixed to the developers best suited to implement the fix. The variability of types of
features studied and modeling techniques used make cross study comparison quite difficult.
Further, the most meaningful way to compare learners for multi-class problems is still an
open research question. Clearly, more studies conducted on different systems using data and
methods that facilitate comparisons are necessary in order for the community to learn from
empirical fault and failure data, so that theories can be tested to determine if and when




In this dissertation we analyzed features of faults, failures and fixes, including fault types,
verification activities, severity levels, investigation effort, artifacts fixed, components fixed
and the effort required to implement fixes for a large industrial case study. The analysis
included data from 21 large-scale software components developed at multiple locations on
different release schedules. We used descriptive statistics, statistical inference through formal
hypothesis testing, and data mining techniques to analyze the data.
To the best of our knowledge, establishing the complete link from the faults that cause
a failure (potential or observed) to the fixes implemented to prevent the failures from
(re)occurring, which was not a simple task, is a unique characteristic of our work. First
of all, locating and gaining access to empirical fault and failure data can be quite difficult, as
many organizations are reluctant to make fault and failure data available for research. Addi-
tionally, collecting and analyzing the data is very time consuming, and often requires domain
expertise. Even more, associating failures with the fault(s) that caused them, as well as the
fixes made to prevent them from (re)occurring is not straightforward as the information is
stored in different types of change document and multiple changes were associated with in-
dividual failures. In our work, the domain knowledge of the NASA personnel was invaluable
in the process of data extraction and ensuring the quality of the data, thus minimizing the
threats to validity of our analysis.
Although some specific aspect of our work were considered in related studies, overall we
analyzed a much more comprehensive set of fault, failure and fix features and we explored
novel research questions. For example, we explored which types of faults cause high priority
failures, the distribution of feature values across releases, and the possibility of predicting
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characteristics of fixes based on information available before the fix is implemented. Addi-
tionally, we considered research questions that have been explored in the past, but have in-
consistent results across different studies (e.g., the relationship between pre and post-release
failures). Some of the most interesting empirical results include:
• Contrary to popular belief, later-life cycle faults are major sources of software fail-
ures. This observation is based not only on the NASA mission presented here but
also the comparison to recent related studies. Further, we found that for the NASA
mission coding faults account for the majority high priority failures (i.e., coding faults
accounted for 50% of safety-critical failures and 52% post-release failures). Thus, these
observations indicate the importance of conducting later life-cycle verification activi-
ties.
• Failures may be caused by multiple faults requiring fixes across multiple components
and artifacts. Related studies relied on assumptions or used heuristics to handle mul-
tiple related faults, or simply limited the analysis to the first fix. Our results clearly
show change tracking system must be designed to track multiple fixes associated with a
single failure and that the practitioners and researchers have to take the spread of soft-
ware fixes into account. For the NASA mission, the spread of fixes across components
was significantly affected by the software architecture.
• Traditional data mining techniques used on fault and failure features were successful
in predicting the effort required to implement fixes. Although predictions with respect
to the artifacts fixed and architectural groups fixed could each be explained in terms
of a single feature, fix effort could not. Despite the fact that effort prediction with
respect to project schedule and development effort has been researched extensively,
effort prediction specifically focussed on fixing faults has received little attention. Fu-
ture research should further explore effort prediction focused on fixing faults as the
quantification of fix effort showed that fixing faults associated with 20% of the failures
accounted for 83% of the cumulative effort spent fixing all faults.
• Improvements in change tracking systems can help facilitate advancing the empirical
knowledge from which best practices can be drawn. In our work the ability to track
multiple fixes associated with a single failure led to interesting observations (e.g. with
respect the spread of fixes across components and artifacts). Additionally, based on
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our exploration of change tracking system used by the mission as well as data used in
related work we suggest using pre-defined data fields whenever possible as they make
data extraction less complicated and improve data quality and the accuracy of the
analysis. We also suggest tracking the life-cycle phase the fault was introduced in (in
addition to the phase the fault was detected in, which is more commonly tracked) as
it would make it possible to determine which faults could have been revealed earlier
and the impact of finding them later.
We used a systematic approach and formal statistical analysis to quantify observed trends,
which is not yet a common practice in software quality assurance. Additionally, throughout
our work whenever possible we compared our results with recent related studies in order to
explore the external validity of the study to help build empirical knowledge across the field.
Using a well-defined terminology and taxonomy consistently across work related for software
quality assurance would allow for much easier comparison of the results and greatly advance
the empirical knowledge.
Finally, we note that we believe significant value was added by conducting this work in
collaboration with the NASA personnel. It is important that researchers and practitioners
work together to use empirical data to investigate theories, determine if and when specific
phenomena hold true, and update the theories accordingly so that software engineering and
quality assurance fields can follow other well established scientific disciplines. In the following
section we discuss some ideas for future work.
12.1 Future Work
The novel contributions of this work are based on the link established between faults,
failures and fixes, which is why the analysis was focused on defining and characterizing the
relationships between faults, failures and fixes. Future work should explore how the metrics
used in this work (i.e., fault, failure and fix features) compare to and/or can be combined
with other metrics (e.g., static code metrics, classification ontologies, etc.), as well as explore
whether the use of additional methods can improve the predictions.
As we discussed in Chapter 3, various metrics have been explored to predict fault and
failure proneness. However, the successfulness of prediction models differ from study to study.
Thus, although the fault and failure features we explored showed potential for predicting
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characteristics of fixes we believe the predictions may be improved with the use of additional
features and that the true measure of success should be based on the analysis of similar
features for other systems. In particular, more features specific to change requests may
improve prediction results. For example, the features we consider may be complementary
to the recent research in [47], which also uses features extracted from change requests. In
particular, the work in [47] focuses on defining hierarchical aerospace ontologies of concepts
and nomenclature to identify problem type and/or equipment type tags in the title and
description fields of change requests to help identify similar change requests. Analysts’ names
and organizations may also be helpful. Additionally, it would be interesting to consider how
fault and failures features can be combined with additional types of metrics (e.g., static code
metrics, design metrics, etc.) to explore whether additional metrics of the failed component
could improve prediction results with respect to locating fixes.
Further analysis conducted by domain experts could also provide practical benefit to
the project. For example, further classification of coding faults based on common types of
coding faults (e.g., logic faults, omission faults, typos, etc.) could be useful for updating
coding standards and checklists used by the developers. Additionally, with respect to the
verification activity quantifying the effort spent on each activity and further exploring the
SCRs discovered by the common ’analysis’ activity could each help characterize the most
effective ways to find faults. A further study of safety-critical, on-orbit SCRs based on manual
exploration may help identifying some trends and preventing such SCRs in the future.
A major area for future work is defining a standardized taxonomy that is representative
of the relationships between faults, failures and fixes (e.g., a single failure caused by multiple
faults). Such a taxonomy would promote comparison across multiple case studies and enrich
the empirical software engineering knowledge based on accurate representation of the fault,
failure and fix relationships.
In Chapter 10 we discussed some traditional machine learning techniques, that is, classifi-
cation learning, association learning, numerical prediction and clustering, and applied those
that were applicable. We believe exploring additional techniques could improve prediction
results. In particular, methods based on multi-variate correlation may reveal additional in-
teresting trends. For example, Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) could be used to model
dependencies among fault and failure features (and possibly other change request features)
to determine the probability that a certain component would need to be fixed. Implication
networks, which are made up of directed graphs in which the nodes represent individual
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variables or hypotheses and the arcs signify the existence of a direct implication (influence)
between two adjacent nodes, may be useful to help analysts’ as he or she implements the fix
as the value taken on by one node is then dependent on the values taken on by all variables
that influence it. Each value indicates the degree of belief that an unobserved variable is
’true’. Thus, as a component (or artifact) is fixed the implication network could be used
to determine what other components will be fixed. Another benefit of using implication
networks is that the values are updated every time new information is obtained (e.g., some
evidence is observed), which means the network would be constantly updating as new change
requests are entered and fixed. Additionally, considering higher-order associations (i.e., be-
yond 1st order association) through techniques such as sequence mining and multi-relational
association rules mining may improve the usability of the association rules learned. Using
the approach suggested in [64] it may be possible to incorporate the implication networks
and association rules to form an associated network structure.
We believe the natural progression of the research work presented in this dissertation
would be to explore addition information (i.e. features) as well as additional methods (i.e.,
additional data mining techniques) at various levels of abstraction (e.g., sub-component,
module level, file level, etc.) on additional case studies.
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